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FEAR OF FLYING-THE FUGITIVE'S FLEETING
RIGHT TO A FEDERAL APPEAL
JAMES M. GRIPPANDO*
INTRODUCTION

In Molinaro v. New Jersey' the Supreme Court for the first time dismissed immediately and with prejudice2 an appeal by a criminal defend* Associate, Steel Hector & Davis; B.A. 1980, University of Florida; J.D. 1982,
University of Florida; Clerk to the Honorable Thomas A. Clark, United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit (1983-84).
1. 396 U.S. 365 (1970) (per curiam).
2. Molinaro marked a significant departure from the Court's prior practice Before
Molinaro, the Court conditioned dismissal on the appellant's failure to return to custody
within a specified time and, if the appellant failed to return, the Court ordered that the
fugitive's appeal be "left off the docket until directionsto the contrary," Bonahan v. Nebraska, 125 U.S. 692, 692 (1887) (emphasis added). By comparison, the Molinaro Court
expressly stated that the dismissal would be effective immediately (not conditioned on the
appellant's failure to return), and although it did not specifically state that the dismissal
was with prejudice, the opinion contained no qualifying language that would indicate that
any "directions to the contrary" would be forthcoming. Accordingly, Molinaro has uniformly been interpreted to authorize immediate dismissal with prejudice of fugitives' and
former fugitives' appeals. See, eg., United States v. $129,374 in United States Currency,
769 F.2d 583, 588 (9th Cir. 1985) ("in Molinaro, the Court did not hold the appeal in
abeyance; it dismissed the appeal entirely"), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 863 (1986); United
States v. Amado, 754 F.2d 31, 32 (1st Cir. 1985) (relying on Molinaro to state that
"[t]here can be no doubt of our authority to dismiss the [fugitive's] appeal with prejudice"); United States v. Tunnell, 650 F.2d 1124, 1126 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing Molinaro for
the proposition that an "appellate court may dismiss an appeal, with final prejudice, if the
defendant flees after filing a notice of appeal"). One court has even questioned the extent
to which appellate courts have discretion to order anything but an immediate dismissal
with prejudice. See United States v. Shelton, 508 F.2d 797, 799 (5th Cir.) (indirectly
questioning whether "a court retains any discretion after Molinaro"), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 828 (1975). Most courts, however, have exercised such discretion and have entered
a variety of orders, including unconditional dismissal with prejudice, see, eg., United
States v. Gordon, 538 F.2d 914, 915 (1st Cir. 1976) (per curiam) (granting government's
motion to dismiss with prejudice without giving "some additional opportunity for the
absent appellant to appear"), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 936 (1979), unconditional dismissal
without prejudice, see, eg., United States v. Davis, 625 F.2d 79, 79 (5th Cir. 1980) (per
curiam), conditional dismissal with prejudice, see, eg., United States v. Sotomayor, 592
F.2d 1219, 1220 n.1 (2d Cir. 1979) (appellant's failure to comply with court's order to
return to custody results in dismissal with prejudice), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 919 (1980);
United States v. Sperling, 506 F.2d 1323, 1345 n.33 (2d Cir. 1974) (same), cert. denied,
420 U.S. 962 (1975), and conditional dismissal without prejudice, see, eg., United States
v. Shelton, 482 F.2d 848, 849 (5th Cir.) (per curiam) (appellant's failure to return to
custody results in dismissal without prejudice), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1075 (1973).
Furthermore, since Molinaro, the difference between a dismissal with prejudice and
dismissal without prejudice may, as a practical matter, be purely semantic. Fugitives
who have attempted to reinstate their appeals on returning to custody have had little
success, and case law indicates that they face formidable barriers to reinstatement. See,
eg., Estrada v. United States, 585 F.2d 742, 742 (5th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (denying
request for reinstatement "without at least a showing of good cause"); United States v.
Smith, 544 F.2d 832, 834 (5th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (citing Molinaro in denying request
for reinstatement and remarking that the "reinstatement of an abandoned appeal is an
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ant who had escaped from custody during the pendency of his appeal.
Unfortunately, the Court did not clearly articulate the basis for dismissal, stating only that a defendant's escape "from the restraints placed
upon him pursuant to the conviction .... disentitles the defendant to call

upon the resources of the Court for determination of his claims." 3 The
federal courts have struggled ever since to divine the decision's true rationale. The courts still have not been able to agree on the basis for
Molinaro and have failed to consider the principles that limit its application. Nonetheless, based on Molinaro, nearly every federal court of appeals has expressly recognized its power to dismiss the appeals of escaped
appellants.4
The confusion caused by Molinaro did not present serious problems
until, in response to increasing numbers of fleeing federal offenders,' the
courts of appeals began to extend the holding in Molinaro. In 1982, the
Eleventh Circuit extended Molinaro to dismiss with prejudice the appeal

of a recaptured fugitive who escaped from custody after conviction but
before sentencing and who, unlike the appellant in Molinaro, was not a

fugitive at any time during the pendency of his appeal.6 In 1984, the
same court further extended Molinaro to dismiss with prejudice the appeal of a recaptured fugitive who fled during trial-before conviction and
sentencing-and who was convicted in absentia.7 Neither these decisions, nor other cases that have expanded the rationale of Molinaro,8 sat-

extraordinary request"); United States v. Shelton, 508 F.2d 797, 798-99 (5th Cir.) (relying
on Molinaro to deny request for reinstatement), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 828 (1975).
3. Molinaro v. New Jersey, 396 U.S. 365, 366 (1970) (per curiam). The Supreme
Court's latest explanation is equally cryptic. See United States v. Sharpe, 105 S. Ct. 1568,
1573 n.2 (1985) ("dismissal ... is based on the equitable principle that a fugitive from
justice is 'disentitled' to call upon this Court for a review of his conviction").
4. Lewis v. Delaware State Hosp., 490 F. Supp. 177, 181-82 (D. Del. 1980); see
United States v. Amado, 754 F.2d 31, 32 (1st Cir. 1985); United States v. Holmes, 680
F.2d 1372, 1373-74 (11th Cir. 1982) (per curiam), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1015 (1983);
Arana v. United States Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 673 F.2d 75, 77 (3d Cir.
1982) (per curiam); United States v. Sperling, 506 F.2d 1323, 1345 n.33 (2d Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 962 (1975); United States v. Swigart, 490 F.2d 914, 915 (10th Cir.
1973); Brinlee v. United States, 483 F.2d 925, 926-27 (8th Cir. 1973) (per curiam); United
States v. Shelton, 482 F.2d 848, 849 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1075 (1973);
Dawkins v. Mitchell, 437 F.2d 646, 647-48 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (per curiam); see also United
States v. Snow, 748 F.2d 928, 930 (4th Cir. 1984) (although court allowed appeal to
continue as escapee was recaptured within 30 days of escape, it recognized its power to
dismiss the appeal); United States v. Dawson, 350 F.2d 396, 397 (6th Cir. 1965) (per
curiam) (predating Molinaro).
5. See United States v. Sharpe, 105 S. Ct. 1568, 1594 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
("The procedural question [of whether a fugitive's appeal should be dismissed] is important because escapes ... [by drug smugglers] are apparently not uncommon.").
6. See United States v. Holmes, 680 F.2d 1372, 1373 (11 th Cir. 1982) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1015 (1983). See infra notes 33-46 and accompanying text.
7. See United States v. London, 723 F.2d 1538, 1538-39 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 104
S. Ct. 2684 (1984). See infra notes 47-57 and accompanying text.
8. Molinaro has been expanded not only to justify dismissal of an appeal for flight
occurring prior to the filing of a notice of appeal, see supra notes 6-7 and accompanying
text, but for flight occurring outside the context of direct criminal appeals altogether.
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isfactorily examine the competing principles that must be considered in
deciding whether to extend Molinaro.
This Article identifies the principles that limit the federal courts'
power to expand Molinaro and suggests an approach the federal circuit
courts should apply in deciding whether to dismiss the appeal of a criminal defendant based on status as a fugitive or former fugitive. Part I
examines the principal cases that have shaped the law. Part II identifies
and explains constraints on the federal courts' power to decline to exercise jurisdiction over a fugitive or former fugitive's criminal appeal. It
then explores the nature and source of the judicial power that permits
courts, under proper circumstances, to decline to exercise jurisdiction
based on the appellant's flight. Finally, the Article suggests an approach
to the problem that balances the interests favoring dismissal against the
competing principles requiring courts to entertain the appeal.
See, e.g., United States v. $129,374 in United States Currency, 769 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir.
1985) (applying Molinaro to bar petition to intervene by fugitive's successor), cert. denied,
106 S. Ct. 863 (1986); Conforte v. Commissioner, 692 F.2d 587, 589-90 (9th Cir. 1982)
(taxpayer, fugitive after his conviction for tax evasion, not entitled to prosecute appeal
from civil judgment sustaining tax deficiencies and penalties), stay denied, 459 U.S. 1309,
1312 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice 1983) (acknowledging that although the Supreme Court
has not extended Molinaro beyond its facts, courts of appeals have frequently done so);
Arana v. United States Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 673 F.2d 75, 77 n.2 (3d Cir.
1982) (per curiam) (acknowledging that Molinaro involved a criminal appeal but noting
that "nothing in the Supreme Court's opinion suggests that the rule announced there is
applicable only in the criminal-law context" and thus applying Molinaro to administrative deportation proceedings); Doyle v. United States Dep't of Justice, 668 F.2d 1365,
1365-66 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (fugitive "may not demand that a federal court
service his complaint" under the Freedom of Information Act), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
1002 (1982); Broadway v. City of Montgomery, 530 F.2d 657, 658-59 (5th Cir. 1976)
(dismissal of fugitive's appeal in action for damages and injunctive relief from allegedly
illegal wiretap); Brin v. Marsh, 596 F. Supp. 1007, 1008-09 (D.D.C. 1984) (dismissing
mandamus action of fugitive service member); Beckett v. Cuyler, 523 F. Supp. 104, 10506 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (dismissal of prisoner's civil rights suit after his flight from work
release program); Seibert v. Johnston, 381 F. Supp. 277, 278-80 (E.D. Okla. 1974) (dismissing fugitive's civil rights action). Courts have split on the question whether Molinaro
should be applied to dismiss claims in prisoners' habeas corpus petitions. Compare Hall
v. Alabama, 700 F.2d 1333, 1338-39 (11th Cir.) (petitioner by escaping from custody of
state court waived right to pursue state remedies, thereby foreclosing his right to federal
review of habeas claims), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 859 (1983); Gonzales v. Stover, 575 F.2d
827, 827-28 (10th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (district court properly declined to entertain a
§ 2254 petition where petitioner was a fugitive) and Fowler v. Leeke, 509 F. Supp. 544,
546 n.3 (D.S.C. 1979) ("There is no readily apparent reason to apply the rule [established
in Molinaro] less stringently to collateral attacks at the trial court level than to direct
appeals at an appellate level."), appeal dismissed mem., 644 F.2d 878 (4th Cir. 1981) with
Williams v. Holbrook, 691 F.2d 3, 13 (1st Cir. 1982) (district court erred in applying
Molinaro to dismiss former fugitive's habeas petition filed after her return to custody) and
Brinlee v. Crisp, 608 F.2d 839, 857 (10th Cir. 1979) (prisoner's prior escapes were not
such a deliberate bypass of state procedures as to constitute a waiver of federal habeas
claims), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1047 (1980).
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DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW ALLOWING DISMISSAL OF
FUGITIVES' APPEALS

The earliest case in which the Supreme Court conditionally dismissed
an appeal of an escaped convict based on his fugitive status was Smith v.
United States.9 In Smith, a criminal defendant appealed from an adverse
ruling of a state supreme court. At a hearing on defense counsel's motion to set the case for argument, counsel admitted to the Court that the
defendant had escaped and was not within the control of the court below
either actually, by being in custody, or constructively, by being out on
bail.l° In light of the defendant's absence, the Court deemed hearing the
defendant's appeal a useless act:
If we affirm the judgment, he is not likely to appear to submit to his
sentence. If we reverse it and order a new trial, he will appear or not,
as he may consider most for his interest. Under such circumstances,
we are not 1inclined to hear and decide what may prove to be only a
moot case.
The Court explained that it had the "discretion to refuse to hear a criminal case in error, unless the convicted party.., is where he can be made
to respond to any judgment we may render." 12 Therefore, the Court
ordered that, "unless the [defendant] ... submit himself to the jurisdiction of the court below on or before the first day of our next term," the
appeal would be removed from the docket.13
Soon after deciding Smith, the Supreme Court faced a similar situation
in Bonahan v. Nebraska. 4 In Bonahan, the defendant challenged his
state conviction for murder as a violation of the double jeopardy clause.' 5
The state supreme court denied him relief, and he appealed to the United
States Supreme Court. As in Smith, the appellant in Bonahan fled during the pendency of his appeal. 6 Relying on Smith, the Court ordered
that, unless the defendant surrendered or was recaptured before the last
day of the term, the appeal' 7would be removed from the docket "until
directions to the contrary.'
Several important points emerged from the Smith and Bonahan decisions. The Smith decision was based on two factors, both stemming from
the appellant's absence. First, because he was a fugitive, the defendant
could not be made to respond to the Court's judgment. Second, because
9. 94 U.S. 97 (1876).
10. Id. at 97.
11. Id.
12. Id.

13. Id. at 98.
14. 125 U.S. 692 (1887).
15. See Bohanan v. Nebraska, 118 U.S. 231, 233 (1886) (in ruling on a prior motion
to dismiss, the Court noted that the defendant had set out as a defense "immunity from a
second trial for the same offence, by reason of Article V. of the amendments of the Constitution of the United States").
16. Bonahan v. Nebraska, 125 U.S. 692, 692 (1887).
17. See id.
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he could not be made to respond, the Court would be performing a useless act in hearing the appeal.1 8 This latter point stems entirely from the
nature of the relief sought in the appeal-a new trial.1 9 The Court presumed that if the defendant would not return for his appeal, he would

not return for a retrial if, in his absence, the Court heard his appeal and
granted the relief sought.20 Thus, in Smith, hearing the appeal would
have been pointless.
In contrast to Smith, the Bonahan decision rests on a single rationale.

This conclusion can only be deduced from the circumstances, because
the Court relied on Smith without providing independent reasons for dis-

missing the appeal. However, the deduction is made easily in light of the
nature of the relief sought by the appellant in Bonahan-ajudgment of
acquittal.21 The defendant challenged his conviction as a violation of
double jeopardy principles. Therefore, if his appeal were successful, re-

trial would have been impossible, and a judgment of acquittal would

have been entered.2 2 In these circumstances, any defendant, whether a
fugitive or incarcerated, would obviously abide by the Court's favorable
judgment, and entertaining the appeal would not be useless. Accord-

ingly, the "useless act" rationale of the Smith decision was inapplicable
in Bonahan. Because the Bonahan Court relied on Smith, however, it

must therefore be presumed that the Court relied entirely on the other
rationale articulated in Smith: the defendant must be "where he can be
made to respond to any judgment," including an adverse judgment.3'
Thus, Bonahan made clear that hearing an appeal need not be pointless
before the court has discretion to dismiss the case based on the appel-

lant's fugitive status. Rather, the court need only be unable to enforce an
adverse decree.2 4

18. Smith v. United States, 94 U.S. 97, 97 (1876).
19. The Court indicated that reversal would result in an order of a new trial. See id.
20. See id.
21. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
22. See, eg., Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978). In Burks, the Court held that
a retrial after reversal of conviction for insufficiency of the evidence would violate the
double jeopardy clause. "Since we hold today that the Double Jeopardy Clause precludes
a second trial... the only ... remedy available... is the direction of a judgment of
acquittal." Id at 18.
23. Smith v. United States, 94 U.S. 97, 97 (1876) (emphasis added).
24. In Allen v. Georgia, 166 U.S. 138 (1897), the Court made it clear that the basis
for dismissal of a fugitive's appeal was the Court's inability to enforce an adverse judgment. In Allen, the defendant, after being convicted of murder and sentenced to death,
filed a writ of error to the state supreme court. Thereafter, the defendant escaped from
custody, and the state supreme court dismissed his appeal. The defendant was subsequently recaptured, and resentenced to death. Id. at 138-39. He then filed an application
for writ of error to the United States Supreme Court, urging that the state court's dismissal of the appeal based on his flight was a denial of due process. Id. at 139.
The Supreme Court affirmed the state supreme court's dismissal and made explicit the
rationale it had earlier implied in Smith and Bonahan:
By escaping from legal custody he has, by the laws of most, if not all, of the
States, committed a distinct criminal offence; and it seems but a light punishment for such offence to hold that he has thereby abandoned his right to prose-
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An appreciation of the effect Bonahan had on the Smith decision is
helpful in understanding the Supreme Court's holding in Molinaro v.
New Jersey.25 In Molinaro, the defendant appealed his state court conviction and, like the defendants in Smith and Bonahan, was considered a
fugitive during the pendency of his appeal. Under these circumstances,
the Court, in oft-quoted language, "decline[d] to adjudicate" the defendant's appeal:
No persuasive reason exists why this Court should proceed to adjudicate the merits of a criminal case after the convicted defendant who
has sought review escapes from the restraints placed upon him pursuant to the conviction. While such an escape does not strip the case of
its character as an adjudicable case or controversy, we believe it disentitles the defendant to call upon the resources of the Court for determination of his claims. In the absence of specific provision to the
contrary in the statute under which Molinaro appeals, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1257(2), we conclude, in light of the Smith and Bonahan decisions,
that the Court has the authority to dismiss the appeal on this
ground.2 6
This critical language from Molinaro reveals the full extent of the
Court's holding. First, it identifies the crucial facts under which dismissal is warranted: a "convicted defendant" 1) "has sought review" and
2) "escapes" from custody after conviction. The key language here is
"has sought review." This language limits the Court's holding to a defendant who files a notice of appeal, thereby availing himself of the appellate process, and subsequently escapes.2 7 Second, the Court's express
reliance on Smith and Bonahan demonstrates its continued recognition
of the discretionary power to dismiss an appeal where the defendant is
not "where he can be made to respond to any judgment"-including an
adverse judgment-the court might enter.2 8
cute a writ of error, sued out to review his conviction. Otherwise he is put in a
position ofsaying to the court: "Sustain my writ and I will surrendermyself, and
take my chances upon a second trial; deny me a new trial and I will leave the
State, orforever remain in hiding." We consider this as practically a declaration
of the terms upon which he is willing to surrender, and a contempt of its authority, to which no court is bound to submit. It is much more becoming to its
dignity that the court should prescribe the conditions upon which an escaped
convict should be permitted to appear and prosecute his writ, than that the
latter should dictate the terms upon which he will consent to surrender himself
to its custody.
Id. at 141 (emphasis added). See cases cited in infra note 28.
25. 396 U.S. 365 (1970) (per curiam).
26. Id. at 366.
27. See United States v. London, 723 F.2d 1538, 1540 (11th Cir.) (Johnson, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2684 (1984).
28. This conclusion is buttressed by the Molinaro Court's citation of Allen v. Georgia, 166 U.S. 138 (1897), in which the defendant was a fugitive at the time of his state
court appeal, id. at 139, and Eisler v. United States, 338 U.S. 189 (1949) (per curiam), in
which the petitioner's flight from the country was held to justify removal of his case from
the Supreme Court's docket, see id. at 190. Furthermore, when applying Molinaro, numerous federal circuit court decisions have stressed the fact that the defendant cannot be
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Although Molinaro's effect is somewhat subtle, it expanded Smith and
Bonahan significantly. The Court in Smith and Bonahan made dismissal
contingent on the defendant's failure to return to the jurisdiction of the
lower court by a certain future date, and both opinions intimated that the
appeal could be reinstated.2 9 In Molinaro, however, dismissal was effective immediately, and the Court gave no indication that the appeal could
be reinstated under any circumstances.30 Thus, with the Court's decision
in Molinaro, the discretionary doctrine developed in Smith had evolved
to allow immediate, unconditional dismissal with prejudice, 31 provided
made to respond to an adverse judgment. See, e.g., Arana v. United States Immigration
& Naturalization Serv., 673 F.2d 75, 77 (3d Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (dismissal appropriate because "[tihere is nothing in the record, nor in the presentation by counsel for [appellant], to indicate that [appellant] would... [return] were we to entertain his appeal
and affirm the district court's denial of habeas relief"); Wayne v. Wyrick, 646 F.2d 1268,
1270-71 (8th Cir. 1981) ("By his escape [appellant] showed his... unwillingness to abide
by decisions adverse to him."); United States v. Wood, 550 F.2d 435, 437-38 (9th Cir.
1976) (dismissal appropriate where "[t]here is no indication that [appellant] would...
[surrender] upon a decision adverse to him"); United States v. Gordon, 538 F.2d 914, 915
(1st Cir. 1976) (noting that courts frequently base dismissal on the "inherent power to
refuse to hear a case when it is unlikely that a convicted party will respond to an unfavorable decision"), cert denied, 441 U.S. 936 (1979); United States v. Swigart, 490 F.2d 914,
915 (10th Cir. 1973) ("any court has the inherent discretion to refuse to hear the claim of
a litigant who is willing to comply with that court's decree only if it is favorable");
Brinlee v. United States, 483 F.2d 925, 926-27 (8th Cir. 1973) (per curiam) ("the
Supreme Court's decision in Smith ... rests upon the inherent discretion of any court to
refuse to hear the claim of a litigant who indicates that he will comply with that court's
decree only if it is favorable") (emphasis in original) (quoting Johnson v. Laird, 432 F.2d
77, 79 (9th Cir. 1970)); United States v. Shelton, 482 F.2d 848, 849 (5th Cir.) (per
curiam) (the rationale underlying Molinaro is the "discretion of the court to refuse to
consider the claim of a litigant who indicates that he will comply with the court's decree
only if it is favorable"), cert denied, 414 U.S. 1075 (1973); United States v. Tremont, 438
F.2d 1202, 1203 (1st Cir. 1971) (per curiam) (that defendant "can abscond, to return only
if it should develop that his conviction is vacated, does not sit well"); Dawkins v. Mitchell, 437 F.2d 646, 648 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (per curiam) (appellants "have appeared by counsel only, and are willing to enjoy the fruits of any legal victory, but it is not apparent that
they are willing to accept an adverse decree, and there is certainly no guarantee that they
can be compelled to do so"); see also Barker v. Jones, 668 F.2d 154, 155 (2d Cir. 1982)
(rationale of cases holding that state court's dismissal of a fugitive's appeal is not violative
of due process "is that the order and judgment are unenforceable because the appellant
has placed himself beyond the control of the court"); Ruetz v. Lash, 500 F.2d 1225, 122930 (7th Cir. 1974) (Supreme Court has determined that there is no denial of due process
when a state dismisses a fugitive's appeal, since "appellant... has placed himself beyond
the control of the court"); Lewis v. Delaware State Hosp., 490 F. Supp. 177, 182 (D. Del.
1980) ("By escaping from confinement, [habeas corpus petitioner] has indicated that he
will only submit himself to this Court's jurisdiction if it is favorable.").
29. See supra text accompanying notes 13 and 17.
30. Molinaro, 396 U.S. at 366 ("The dismissal need not await the end of the Term or
the expiration of a fixed period of time, but should take place at this time.").
31. See United States v. Shelton, 508 F.2d 797, 798 (5th Cir.) ("In Molinaro v. New
Jersey, the Supreme Court shifted its own practice and unconditionally dismissed the
appeal of a fugitive without waiting to see if he might return or be captured."), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 828 (1975) (citation omitted); see also United States v. Amado, 754 F.2d
31, 32 (1st Cir. 1985) (relying on Molinaro the court noted, "[t]here can be no doubt of
our authority to dismiss the appeal with prejudice"); Shaw v. Estelle, 542 F.2d 954, 955
(5th Cir. 1976) (per curiam) (dictum) ("[h]ad Shaw escaped while appealing to this court,
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that the defendant escaped after having sought appellate review and, due
to his absence, could not be forced to comply with an unfavorable
decree.32

Since Molinaro, the most significant expansion of this unconditional
dismissal doctrine has been the Eleventh Circuit's decision in United
States v. Holmes.33 In Holmes, the defendant was convicted by a jury for
violations of federal narcotics laws, and soon afterward entered a guilty
plea on a charge of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. 34 The
district court set the same sentencing date for both charges. When the
defendant failed to appear for sentencing, the district court issued a
bench warrant for his arrest and declared his bail bond forfeited. 3
The defendant was recaptured after almost two years and was returned
to the jurisdiction of the trial court for sentencing. The court imposed a
sentence and entered final judgment. The defendant then brought an appeal from this conviction on all counts.36
Relying on Molinaro and its progeny, the government moved to dis-

miss the defendant's appeal based on hisformer fugitive status. The government candidly admitted,3 7 and the court acknowledged, that the cases

it cited were all distinguishable because the defendants in each of the
cases did not flee until after filing a notice of appeal, whereas Holmes fled

after conviction but before sentencing and, thus, before filing a notice of
appeal. 38 Nonetheless, the government argued that the policy considerations justifying dismissal in the Molinaro line of cases applied regardless
of whether the defendant fled before or after filing a notice of appeal.3 9
The court agreed and dismissed the appeal, holding that "a defendant
who flees after conviction, but before sentencing, waives his right to ap-

peal from the conviction unless he can establish that his absence was due
to matters completely beyond his control."40

he would have been subject to unconditional dismissal"); cf Joensen v. Wainwright, 615
F.2d 1077, 1079 (5th Cir. 1980) ("If the Supreme Court can summarily and unconditionally dismiss an escapee's appeal ...

there is no reason why a state court may not do

likewise."). See also supra note 2.
32. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
33. 680 F.2d 1372 (11th Cir. 1982) (per curiam), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1015 (1983).
34. See id. at 1373.
35. See id.
36. See id.

37. See Brief of Appellee at 13, United States v. Holmes, 680 F.2d 1372 (11 th Cir.
1982) (per curiam), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1015 (1983).
38. See Holmes, 680 F.2d at 1373.
39. See Brief of Appellee at 13-14, United States v. Holmes, 680 F.2d 1372 (11 th Cir.
1982) (per curiam), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1015 (1983).
40. Holmes, 680 F.2d at 1373. The court expressly excepted from the scope of the
waiver the former fugitive's right to appeal from errors in sentencing. See id. In a later
case the court further limited the scope of the waiver by holding that escape does not
effect a waiver of the defendant's right to counsel at the deferred sentencing hearing. See
Golden v. Newsome, 755 F.2d 1478, 1481-84 (11th Cir. 1985).
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Although the Holmes court purported to rely on Molinaro,4' neither of
the two reasons it offered in support of its holding were articulated by the
Supreme Court in Molinaro. First, the Holmes court emphasized that
the right of appeal is purely statutory and it therefore can be waived
"through flight which may postpone filing a notice of appeal for years
after conviction."'4 2 Thus, delay caused by the defendant's flight is a basis for dismissing an appeal filed after recapture. Second, the court declared that it "would fly in the face of common sense and sound reason"
to allow former fugitives "to seek relief from the very legal system that
they previously had seen fit only to defy." 43 Therefore, the defendant's
defiance of the "legal system" is another suggested basis for dismissal.
The Holmes court, however, cited no cases sanctioning dismissal of an
appeal based on delay or defendant's defiance." Further, although the
court quoted Molinaro,4"it failed to observe that the defendant, who was
now incarcerated, was "where he [could] be made to respond to any
judgment" the court might render." Consequently, Holmes established
a new set of criteria to justify dismissal of an appeal by a former fugitive
who files an appeal after recapture.
Following Holmes, the Eleventh Circuit further extended its discretionary power to dismiss unconditionally the appeals of former fugitives.
In United States v. London,4' the defendant fled during a six-month jury
trial in which he and eleven other defendants faced charges related to an
alleged marijuana smuggling organization.4 8 Following the defendant's
escape, the trial court exercised its discretion to proceed with the defendant's trial in absentia,49 which resulted in conviction of all of the defend41. See Holmes, 680 F.2d at 1374 (quoting Molinaro v. New Jersey, 396 U.S. 365, 366
(1970) (per curiam)).
42. .AL at 1373-74.
43. Id. at 1374.
44. Some cases had mentioned "defiance" as a basis for dismissal, see, eg., United
States v. O'Neal, 453 F.2d 344, 345 (10th Cir. 1972) (per curiam), but in cases such as
O'Neal the appellant remained a fugitive at the time of dismissal. Prior to Holmes, the
only cases decided on similar facts that considered the effect of "delay" held that dismissal was inappropriate. See United States v. Tunnell, 650 F.2d 1124, 1126 (9th Cir. 1981)
(12-year hiatus between conviction and sentencing created by defendant's flight gave government justifiable concern about the potential difficulty in retrying case but did not warrant dismissal); United States v. Tapia-Lopez, 521 F.2d 582 (9th Cir. 1975) (per curiam)
(five-year delay not commented on by the court).
45. See Holmes, 680 F.2d at 1374.
46. Smith v. United States, 94 U.S. 97, 97 (1876). See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
47. 723 F.2d 1538 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1228 (1984).
48. Id. at 1538.
49. Under Rule 43(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, a defendant may
be tried in absentia when he "voluntarily absents himself after the trial has commenced."
Fed. R. Crim. P. 43(b)(1). See Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S. 17, 18-20 (1973) (per
curiam). The trial court's discretion to proceed in absentia under Rule 43, however, is
,'very narrow." United States v. London, 723 F.2d 1538, 1539 (1 1th Cir.), cert. denied,
467 U.S. 1228 (1984); see United States v. Benavides, 596 F.2d 137, 139 (5th Cir. 1979).
Aside from becoming a fugitive, a defendant can also waive his right to be present at
trial by obtaining the court's permission to be absent, see United States v. Jones, 514 F.2d
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ants on various counts of the indictment. Six of the defendant's
codefendants, who had not fled, sought appellate review and had their
convictions affirmed.50
Nearly three years after trial, the defendant was apprehended and returned to the jurisdiction of the district court for sentencing.5 He then
filed a notice of appeal, and the government moved to dismiss because
the defendant became a fugitive during trial.52 Relying on Molinaro and
Holmes, the court granted the motion and dismissed the appeal. 3 In
light of the decision in Holmes, the court's holding in London is not
surprising. As the London court observed, flight during trial is, in relation to the appellate process, no different from flight after conviction but
before sentencing; "[i]n neither situation has a final, appealable judgment
been entered from which an appeal could be taken."5 4 London is significant, however, because it narrows and explains the rationale of Holmes.
The court's comparison of escape during trial to the situation faced in
Holmes is particularly instructive:
In Holmes the escape disrupted the sentencing process and appellate
review; in the present case the defendant disrupted a prolonged trial
and flaunted his disregard for the orderly court procedures
for the de55
termination of whether he was guilty or not guilty.
As explained earlier, Holmes relied on both delay caused by the defendant's flight and the defendant's defiance of the legal system to dismiss the
appeal. 6 The London court, however, focused only on the defendant's
1331, 1332-33 (D.C. Cir. 1975), or by failing to make a timely objection to the holding of
proceedings in his absence, see United States v. Brown, 571 F.2d 980, 987 (6th Cir. 1978);
see also United States v. Gallo, 763 F.2d 1504, 1529 (6th Cir. 1985) (defendant can waive
right to be present by failing to make timely objection, by voluntary absence or through
court permission), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 826 (1986).
50. See United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 985-86 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
457 U.S. 1136 (1982).
51. United States v. London, 723 F.2d 1538, 1539 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 467 U.S.
1228 (1984).
52. Id.
53. Id. Curiously, the London court made no mention of the court's previous dismissal of the appeal of one of London's codefendants who, like London, had absconded
during trial. See United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 985 n.1 (5th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 457 U.S. 1136 (1982). Nor did the court in Holmes note the dismissal in Phillips.
These oversights, however, may not have been significant. The notice of appeal for the
absconded codefendant in Phillips was filed while he was a fugitive and he remained a
fugitive at the time of dismissal. See id. In contrast, in both Holmes and London, the
defendant was a fugitive neither at the time he sought appellate review nor at the time the
government moved to dismiss the appeal. See United States v. London, 723 F.2d 1538,
1539 (1 lth Cir.) (defendant filed appeal after his recapture), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1228
(1984); United States v. Holmes, 680 F.2d 1372, 1373 (11th Cir. 1982) (per curiam)
(same), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1015 (1983). Thus, Phillips is distinguishable from both
Holmes and London. See Wayne v. Wyrick, 646 F.2d 1268, 1270 (8th Cir. 1981) ("Had
Wayne's attorney attempted to perfect his appeal while he remained at large, the appeal
would surely have been dismissed when the court learned of Wayne's fugitive status.").
54. London, 723 F.2d at 1539.
55. Id.
56. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
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disruption of "a prolonged trial and ...

his disregard for ...orderly
court procedures."57 The court ignored the fact that, due to the defendant's flight, the filing of the notice of appeal was delayed by almost three
years. This shift in focus makes clear that, in the court's view, sustaining
the integrity of the judicial process is an independently sufficient reason
for dismissing the appeal of a former fugitive.
In Smith, Bonahan and Molinaro, the Supreme Court established a
doctrine that allows dismissal of a criminal appeal based on a defendant's
flight during the pendency of his appeal.5 8 As London and Holmes
demonstrate, the lower federal courts have expanded this discretionary
doctrine apparently to allow dismissal of an appeal for flight occurring at
any time during the defendant's custody and at any stage of the judicial
process.5 9 Despite this expansion, the courts have not yet identified the
nature and source of the power permitting them to dismiss an appeal, nor
have they recognized any principles that might limit the exercise of that
power."° Before the legitimacy of the doctrine established in Molinaro
and the courts' recent expansion of that doctrine, can be evaluated, it is
essential to determine the nature and source of, and limitations on, the
courts' dismissal power.
II.

THE NATURE AND SOURCE OF THE JUDICIARY'S
DISMISSAL POWER

A.

Constraints on the FederalCourts' Power to Dismiss Appeals

Under the Constitution, Congress possesses plenary power to regulate
appellate jurisdiction. Article III, section 1 leaves the establishment and
regulation of inferior federal courts entirely to the prerogative of Congress. Thus, Congress, not the judiciary, establishes and defines the jurisdiction of the circuit courts.6 ' Similarly, article III, section 2, makes the
57. London, 723 F.2d at 1539.
58. See supra notes 9-32 and accompanying text.
59. See supra notes 33-57 and accompanying text.
60. In United States v. Baccollo, 725 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1983), the court at least questioned "whether an appellate court has power to dismiss an appeal on account of appellant's conduct before judgment was entered." Id. at 171-72. The court refused to decide
the case on that ground, however, as it felt that "the appeal [was] so plainly frivolous" on
the merits that there was no need to "unnecessarily go out on a limb." Id. at 172.
61. U.S. Const. art. III, § 1; see Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 400-01 (1973)
("decision with respect to inferior federal courts, as well as the task of defining their
jurisdiction, was left to the discretion of Congress"); Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S.
530, 551 (1962) ("The great constitutional compromise that resulted in agreement upon
Art. III, § 1, authorized but did not obligate Congress to create inferior federal courts.");
Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182, 187 (1943) ("Article III left Congress free to establish
inferior federal courts or not as it thought appropriate. It could have declined to create
any such courts, leaving suitors to the remedies afforded by state courts, with such appellate review by this Court as Congress might prescribe."); Redish & Woods, Congressional
Power to Control the Jurisdictionof the Lower Federal Court" A CriticalReview and A
New Synthesis, 124 U. Pa. L. Rev. 45, 46-47 (1975) (Congress possesses discretionary
power to create or abolish lower federal courts); Rotunda, CongressionalPower to Restrict
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Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction equally dependent on congressional action by providing that the Court shall have appellate jurisdiction
"with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall
make."' 62 Thus, article III vests in Congress control over appellate juristhe Jurisdictionof the Lower Federal Courts and the Problem of School Busing, 64 Geo.
L.J. 839, 839-44 (1976) (same).
62. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. Early decisions under the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20,
§§ 1, 13, 22, 25, 1 Stat. 73, 80, 84-86 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28
U.S.C.) made clear Congress' power to establish and control the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction under the "exceptions clause." See Durousseau v. United States, 10 U.S.
(6 Cranch) 307, 313-14 (1810); Wiscart v. D'Auchy, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 321, 327 (1796).
These decisions established the principle that, under the "exceptions clause," Congress
affirmatively grants jurisdiction, rather than makes exceptions to constitutional grants of
jurisdiction. As stated in Durousseau:
When the first legislature of the Union proceeded to carry the third article of
the constitution into effect, they must be understood as intending to execute the
power they possessed of making exceptions to the appellate jurisdiction of the
supreme court. They have not, indeed, made these exceptions in express terms.
They have not declared, that the appellate power of the court shall not extend
to certain cases; but they have described affirmatively its jurisdiction, and this
affirmative description has been understood to imply a negative on the exercise
of such appellate power as is not comprehended within it.
10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 314; see Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 620
(1875); Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 513-14 (1868). See generally Van
Alstyne, A CriticalGuide to Ex parte McCardle, 15 Ariz. L. Rev. 229 (1973) (Ex parte
McCardleappears to settle the question of Congress' authority to make exceptions to the
Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction). To this day, the orthodox view remains that
Congress possesses plenary power to confer or withhold the Supreme Court's appellate
jurisdiction. See E. Corwin, The Constitution and What it Means Today 178 (13th ed.
1973); J. Peltason, Corwin & Peltason's Understanding the Constitution 114-15 (10th ed.
1985); Anderson, The Governmentof Courts: The Power ofCongress UnderArticle III, 68
A.B.A. J. 686, 688 (1982); Anderson, The Power of Congress to Limit the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 1981 Det. C.L. Rev. 753, 753-70; Bator, Congressional
Power Over the Jurisdictionof the Federal Courts, 27 Vill. L. Rev. 1030, 1038-41 (1982);
Berger, CongressionalContractionofFederalJurisdiction, 1980 Wis. L. Rev. 801, 805-10;
Redish, CongressionalPower to Regulate Supreme Court Appellate Jurisdictionunder the
Exceptions Clause: An Internal and External Examination, 27 Vill. L. Rev. 900, 901-03
(1982); Roberts, Now is the Time: Fortifying the Supreme Court's Independence, 35
A.B.A. J. 1, 3-4 (1949); Rossum, Congress, the Constitution, and the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court: The Letter and the Spirit of the Exceptions Clause, 24 Win. &
Mary L. Rev. 385, 386-98 (1983); Van Alstyne, supra, at 254-69; Wechsler, The Courts
and the Constitution, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 1001, 1005 (1965). Congress' power is limited
only by the due process clause and other constitutional provisions. Van Alstyne, supra,
at 263-64; see Sager, The Supreme Court 1980 Term-Forward: ConstitutionalLimitations on Congress'Authorityto Regulate the Jurisdictionof the FederalCourts, 95 Harv. L.
Rev. 17, 70 (1981). But see Redish, supra, at 915-23, 927 (due process and equal protection limitations on Congress' power are at best uncertain and may be limited to Congress'
power to restrict the Supreme Court's jurisdiction in regard to claims of racial equality).
A considerable school of thought, however, seriously disputes Congress' power to control
the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d
Sess. 155-57 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2112, 2218-20; J.
Choper, Judicial Review and the National Political Process: A Functional Reconsideration of the Role of the Supreme Court 53-54 (1980); 0. Stephens & G. Rathjen, The
Supreme Court and the Allocation of Constitutional Power 40 (1980); Brant, Appellate
Jurisdiction: CongressionalAbuseof the Exceptions Clause, 53 Or. L. Rev. 3, 6-28 (1973);
Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdictionof Federal Courts: An Exercise in
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diction at all levels of the federal judiciary:
Congress need not establish inferior courts; Congress need not grant
the full scope of jurisdiction which it is empowered to vest in them;
Congress need not give this [Supreme] Court any appellate power, it
may withdraw appellate jurisdiction once conferred and it may do so
even while a case is sub judice.63
By statute, Congress has expressly conferred jurisdiction on the

Supreme Court over certain appeals of criminal defendants from state
court convictions.' Likewise, Congress has invested the circuit courts
with jurisdiction over the appeals of criminal defendants from final judgments of conviction entered by federal district courts. 65 Congress, howDialectic, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1362, 1364-66 (1953); Merry, Scope of the Supreme Court's
Appellate Jurisdiction: HistoricalBasis, 47 Minn. L. Rev. 53, 68-69 (1962); Ratner, CongressionalPower Over the Appellate Jurisdictionof the Supreme Court, 109 U. Pa. L Rev.
157, 168-73, 201-02 (1960); see also Ratner, MajoritarianConstraintson JudicialReview.
CongressionalControl of Supreme CourtJurisdiction,27 Viii. L. Rev. 929, 932-36, 939-40,
956-58 (1982) (Congress could not totally withdraw appellate jurisdiction from Supreme
Court; it would impair essential functions of the Court).
63. National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 655 (1949)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). But see generally Clinton, A
Mandatory View of FederalCourt Jurisdiction: A Guided Quest for the Original Understanding of Article III, 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 741 (1984) (in-depth historical analysis of
article III suggesting that Congress' power over the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
and inferior federal courts can be understood only by studying the ratification process
and article III as a whole, and that Congress' power may not be plenary).
64. See, eg., 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2) (1982) (conferring appellate jurisdiction over decisions that uphold the validity of a state statute by the highest court of a state).
65. See id.§ 1291 (conferring appellate jurisdiction over "all final decisions of the
district courts"). Although the right to a criminal appeal is not of constitutional dimension, United States v. Holmes, 680 F.2d 1372, 1373 (11th Cir. 1982) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 460 U.S. 1015 (1983); see McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687 (1894), its
significance should not be overlooked:
Every federal criminal defendant has a statutory right to have his or her conviction reviewed by a court of appeals. The statutory right to appeal is deemed so
important that a district court judge is required to inform a defendant specifically of that right after trial and sentencing. The right to appeal is from the
judgment of conviction and not from the sentence. See Coppedge, [369 U.S.
438, 441 (1962)] ("Present federal law has made an appeal from a District
Court's judgment of conviction in a criminal case what is, in effect, a matter of
right.").
United States v. De Bright, 730 F.2d 1255, 1259 (9th Cir. 1984) (emphasis deleted) (citations omitted) (rejecting the concurrent sentence doctrine); see Brewen v. United States,
375 F.2d 285, 286 (5th Cir. 1967) ("It is settled that an appeal from the judgment of a
federal District Court is a matter of right."). See generally Lobsenz, A Constitutional
Right to an Appeak GuardingAgainst UnacceptableRisks of ErroneousConviction, 8 U.
Puget Sound L. Rev. 375, 375-77 (1985) (although right to criminal appeal not of constitutional dimensions, many states have added such provisions to their state constitutions).
Several courts have recognized that, because an individual's liberty is at stake in a criminal appeal, the Molinaro rationale should apply with equal or greater force in civil, rather
than criminal, cases. See Conforte v. Commissioner, 692 F.2d 587, 589-90 (9th Cir.
1982) ("the rule [established in Molinaro] should apply with greater force in civil cases
where an individual's liberty is not at stake"), stay denied, 459 U.S. 1309 (Rehnquist,
Circuit Justice 1983); Doyle v. United States Dep't of Justice, 494 F. Supp. 842, 845
(D.D.C. 1980) ("If the courts may invoke their inherent equitable powers to refuse to
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ever, has enacted no statute permitting the courts to dismiss those
appeals based on the defendant's flight, whether it occurs before or after
filing a notice of appeal. Nor does the Constitution contain any other
provision that would inhibit judicial action to determine the validity of a
criminal conviction.66 Further, the Supreme Court in Molinaro stated
unequivocally that the defendant's "escape does not strip the case of its
character as an adjudicable case or controversy. "67
The federal courts have a "virtually unflagging obligation ...to exercise the jurisdiction given them."'6 s The courts' failure or refusal to exercise that jurisdiction-including jurisdiction over appeals by fugitives
and former fugitives-would impinge on Congress' constitutional power
to establish and define appellate jurisdiction. 69 The judiciary, therefore,
must exercise that jurisdiction to maintain the balance of power preentertain appeals from fugitives who are seeking to overturn criminal convictions, they
surely may do so likewise with respect to those fugitives who merely seek relief under the
Freedom of Information Act."), affd per curiam, 668 F.2d 1365 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 1002 (1982); see also Arana v. United States Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 673 F.2d 75, 77 n.2 (3d Cir. 1982) (per curiam) ("given the plethora of constitutional and statutory procedural protections that are afforded to criminal defendants but
not made available to individuals subjected to administrative deportation proceedings, a
court might exercise greater caution in dismissing the appeal of a convicted party who
has escaped than of a potential deportee who has absconded") (citation omitted). Thus,
in light of the criminal defendant's significant, albeit not constitutional, right to an appeal, and in view of the federal courts' "unflagging obligation" to exercise their jurisdiction, see infra note 68 and accompanying text, courts should dismiss fugitives' appeals
only if a reason so compelling as to overcome these countervailing factors exists.
66. See, e.g., United States v. Lockwood, 382 F. Supp. 1111, 1117 (E.D.N.Y. 1974)
("No constitutional inhibition against court action to determine the validity of a criminal
charge absent a defendant was inserted into our Constitution."). As explained in Lockwood, the drafters did not insert such a provision into the Constitution because contemporary English common law made it unnecessary to consider the issue; fugitives were
condemned through the process of outlawry. See id.; 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries
*319-20; 1 J. Chitty, A Practical Treatise on the Criminal Law 347, 353, 365-68 (1816);
see also United States v. Weinstein, 511 F.2d 622, 628 (2d Cir.) ("at one time the penalty
for failure to appear could be an order outlawing the defendant"), cert. denied, 422 U.S.
1042 (1975).
67. Molinaro v. New Jersey, 396 U.S. 365, 366 (1970) (per curiam),
68. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817
(1976); see England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 415
(1964) ("When a Federal court is properly appealed to in a case over which it has by law
jurisdiction, it is its duty to take such jurisdiction.") (quoting Willcox v. Consolidated
Gas Co., 212 U.S. 19, 40 (1909)); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821)
(dictum) ("It is most true, that this court will not take jurisdiction if it should not: but it
is equally true, that it must take jurisdiction, if it should.... We have no more right to
decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given.
The one or the other would be treason to the constitution."); see also Fair Assessment in
Real Estate Ass'n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 124-25 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring)
("Where Congress has granted the federal courts jurisdiction, we are not free to repudiate
that authority .... The power to control the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts is
assigned by the Constitution to Congress, not to this Court."); United States v. City of
Pittsburgh, 757 F.2d 43, 45 (3d Cir. 1985) (federal court should have "reluctance" to
relinquish "its clearly established jurisdiction").
69. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
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scribed by the separation of powers inherent in the Constitution's tripartite division of government,7 unless one of the court's inherent powers
allows it to refuse jurisdiction.
B. Inherent Powers of the Courts

The Constitution provides that "tihe judicial Power of the United
States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts
as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.""' Because
dismissal of a fugitive's or former fugitive's appeal is not in keeping with

courts' "virtually unflagging obligation" to exercise their jurisdiction,72

dismissal must be pursuant to some authority inherent in the constitu-

tional concept of "judicial power" with which the Constitution and the
Congress have entrusted the courts by virtue of creating them."

The

inherent powers of federal courts are those that "are necessary to the
exercise of all others."'74 The courts in Holmes and London implicated at

70. The tripartite structure established by the Constitution reflects the conferral
of separate and distinct powers on the President, the Congress and the Judiciary. The framers of our Constitution embraced "Montesquieu's view that the
maintenance of independence as between the legislative, the executive and the
judicial branches," was essential to the preservation of liberty.
In re Application of President's Comm'n on Organized Crime, 763 F.2d 1191, 1195 (11 th
Cir. 1985) (quoting Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 116 (1926)). The need for independence stands on the principle that "[t]he accumulation of all powers legislative, executive and judiciary in the same hands, whether of one, a few or many, and whether
hereditary, self appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of
tyranny." Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 960 (1983)
(Powell, J., concurring) (quoting The Federalist No. 47, at 324 (J. Madison) (. Cooke ed.
1961)). Traditionally, the courts have construed the separation of powers doctrine to
prohibit "those arrogations of power to one branch of government which 'disrupt[ ] the
proper balance between the coordinate branches' . . . or 'prevent[ ] [one of those
branches] from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions.'" In re President's
Comm'n, 763 F.2d at 1195 (quoting Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425,
443 (1977)); see Eash v. Riggins Trucking Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 573 (3d Cir. 1985) (en
bane) (Sloviter, J., dissenting) ("the separation of powers doctrine is violated when one
branch of government assumes a function that more properly is entrusted to another").
Furthermore, "[t]he danger of intrusion by one branch of the government on the powers
of another is no less when it is the judiciary that is the usurper." Id. at 575 (Sloviter, J.,
dissenting). Indeed, the framers explicitly identified the dangers of judicial encroachment
on the powers of the other branches:
Were the power ofjudging joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the
subject would be exposed to arbitrary control, for the judge would then be the
legislator. Were it joined to the executive power, the judge might behave with
all the violence of an oppressor.
The Federalist No. 47, at 322 (. Madison) (P. Ford ed. 1898) (quoting Montesquieu)
(emphasis omitted).
71. U.S. Const. art. III, § I.
72. See supra notes 61-70 and accompanying text.
73. See Frankfurter & Landis, Power of Congress Over Procedure in Criminal Contempts in "Inferior"Federal Courts-A Study in Separation of Powers, 37 Harv. L. Rev.
1010, 1016-17 (1924).

74. United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812). The powers of the
federal courts that are "necessary to the exercise of all others" are actually only one
category of the federal courts' inherent powers. One recent decision has concluded that
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least two of these inherent judicial powers in dismissing the appeals of
former fugitives.
1. The Inherent Power to Punish Criminal Contempt
The most prominent inherent judicial power is the power to punish
criminal contempt." Jurists have long regarded criminal contempt sanctions as indispensable to the judiciary's ability to protect the "orderly
administration of justice" and maintain the "authority and dignity of the
court."' 76 Hence, a criminal contempt sanction aims to vindicate the
there are three types of inherent powers. See Eash v. Riggins Trucking Inc., 757 F.2d
557, 562 (3d Cir. 1985) (en banc). The first is "irreducible inherent authority," which
"encompasses an extremely narrow range of authority involving activity so fundamental
to the essence of a court as a constitutional tribunal that.., to deny this power 'and yet
to conceive of courts is a self-contradiction.'" Id. at 562 (quoting Frankfurter & Landis,
supra note 73, at 1023); see Levin & Amsterdam, Legislative Control over Judicial
Rulemaking: A Problem in ConstitutionalRevision, 107 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 30-33 (1958).
Congress does not have the authority to infringe this type of power. See Eash, 757 F.2d
at 562. For example, Congress could not pass a statute forbidding the courts to engage in
any textual interpretation, since that is the basic function of a court. See Merrill, The
Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 28 n.118 (1985) (quoting
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)); see also United States v. Klein,
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 146-47 (1872) (Congress cannot require the Court to decide a case
in a particular way).
The second use of the term inherent powers encompasses those powers "'necessary to
the exercise of all others.'" Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764 (1980)
(quoting United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812)), superseded on other
grounds by Pub. L. No. 96-349, 94 Stat. 1156 (1980) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1927 (1982)). These powers "arise from the nature of the court," Eash, 757 F.2d at
562; see Exparte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 303 (1888), Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 34, and
are "implied from strict functional necessity." Eash, 757 F.2d at 562. The most prominent power among this second category of inherent power is the contempt sanction. See
id. at 562-63; see also Beale, ReconsideringSupervisory Power in CriminalCases: Constitutionaland Statutory Limits on the Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 Colum. L. Rev.
1433, 1468-69 (1984) (contempt power is an important inherent power). See infra note
75 and accompanying text.
The third and final form of inherent power is, in reality, grounded in utility rather than
necessity. These powers are "said to be 'rooted in the notion that a federal court, sitting
in equity, possesses all of the common law equity tools of a Chancery Court (subject, of
course, to congressional limitation) to process litigation to a just and equitable conclusion.' " Eash, 757 F.2d at 563 (quoting ITT Community Dev. Corp. v. Barton, 569 F.2d
1351, 1359 (5th Cir. 1978)). While some courts have referred to this common law equity
power as necessary or "essential," see, e.g., Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 312-13
(1920), "it is clear that such power is necessary only in the sense of being highly useful in
the pursuit of a just result." Eash, 757 F.2d at 563; see Note, Compulsory Reference in
Actions at Law, 34 Harv. L. Rev. 321, 324 (1921).
75. See Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764 (1980), supersededon other
grounds by Pub. L. No. 96-349, 94 Stat. 1156 (1980) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1927 (1982)); see also Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 510 (1873) ("The
power to punish for contempts is inherent in all courts; its existence is essential to the
preservation of order in judicial proceedings.., and consequently to the due administration of justice.").
76. Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764 (1980) (quoting Cooke v.
United States, 267 U.S. 517, 539 (1925)), supersededon other grounds by Pub. L. No. 96349, 94 Stat. 1156 (1980) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1982)); see Levine v.
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court's power and integrity and to deter similar derelictions."
The courts' dismissal of the appeals in Holmes and London resembles a
criminal contempt sanction in at least one important respect. As Holmes
indicates,"8 and as is made very explicit in London, 9 the basis for unconditional dismissal is the defendant's defiance of the legal system and disruption of the judicial process. Dismissal, therefore, seems designed to
sustain the authority and integrity of the court. As such, unconditional
dismissal serves the same purpose in the context of an appeal by a former
fugitive as a sanction for criminal contempt serves in any other setting."0
Despite this common purpose, several significant aspects of the traditional power to punish contumacious conduct suggest that criminal contempt is not the basis for dismissal of former fugitives' appeals.
Although courts have inherent power to punish contempt,"' the Supreme
Court long ago acknowledged that the power is nonetheless subject to
congressional regulation.8 2 With respect to the power to punish flight as
contempt of court, Congress arguably has exercised its regulatory power
United States, 362 U.S. 610, 615 (1960); Michaelson v. United States ex rel. Chi., St. P.,
M. & 0. Ry., 266 U.S. 42, 65 (1924); Myers v. United States, 264 U.S. 95, 103 (1924).
77. See Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 111 (1925); 3 C. Wright, Federal Practice &
Procedure § 702, at 809 (2d ed. 1982); see also United States v. United Mine Workers of
Am., 330 U.S. 258, 302 (1947) (sentences for criminal contempt "are imposed for the
purpose of vindicating the authority of the court").

78. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
79. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
80. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text. The analogy to criminal contempt
is strengthened by the Supreme Court's shift from the conditional dismissal ordered in
Smith and Bonahan, see supra notes 13, 17 and accompanying text, to the unconditional
dismissal in Molinaro. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text. Conditional dismissal is more analogous to civil contempt because it is designed to coerce the fugitive's
return. See, eg., Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 368 (1966) (conditional prison
sentence that could be avoided if witness would answer questions put to him was
designed to coerce compliance and, therefore, was a form of civil contempt); Van Blaricom v. Forscht, 490 F.2d 461, 462 (5th Cir. 1974) (en banc) (per curiam) (dismissing
appeal "without prejudice to appellant's right to have the appeal reinstated" if appellant
returned to custody within 30 days), cert denied, 423 U.S. 915 (1975); cf Doyle v. United
States Dep't of Justice, 494 F. Supp. 842, 845-46 (D.D.C. 1980) (a convicted defendant
who became a fugitive after filing suit under the Freedom of Information Act had his
hands "sullied with his contempt for the tribunals whose assistance he is seeking to invoke. Unless and until he presents himself for service of the sentence lawfully imposed
upon him, this Court will ... refus[e] to assist him with his demands."), aff'd per curiam,
668 F.2d 1365 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cerL denied, 455 U.S. 1002 (1982). See Comment, The
CoerciveFunction of Civil Contempt, 33 U. Chi. L. Rev. 120 (1965) for a discussion of the
differences between civil and criminal contempt.
The purpose of an unconditional dismissal with prejudice, however, is to punish for
past acts, not to coerce future conduct. See Allen v. Georgia, 166 U.S. 138, 141 (1897)

(dismissal of a fugitive's writ of error "seems but a light punishment" for his escape); see
also In re Kave, 760 F.2d 343, 351 (1st Cir. 1985) ("The purpose of a criminal contempt
proceeding is the vindication of the court's authority by punishingfor a past violation of a
court order.") (emphasis in original).
81. See Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 615 (1960); Exparte Robinson, 86 U.S.

(19 Wall.) 505, 510 (1873); Eash v. Riggins Trucking Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 562 n.8 (3d Cir.
1985) (en banc).
82. See Michaelson v. United States ex rel. Chi., St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 266 U.S. 42, 65-
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so as to remove dismissal of an appeal from the permissible range of

contempt sanctions that courts may impose.
Historically, the only available penalties for failure to appear at a judi-

cial proceeding were forfeiture of money and criminal contempt proceedings.83 Because Congress deemed these penalties inadequate to deter

flight and to punish those who did flee, the first federal bail jumping
statute was enacted in 1954, and was later revised as part of the Bail
Reform Act of 1966.84 The 1966 Act prescribed specific penalties for
failure to appear, but expressly reserved the courts' power to punish for
contempt.8 5 Subsequently, Congress passed the Comprehensive Crime
Control Act of 1984,86 which "basically continues the current law offense
of bail jumping."8 " Thus, Congress appears to have affirmed the notion
that flight may be punished through the courts' contempt power. 88
67 (1924); Exparte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 510-11 (1874); 3 C. Wright, supra
note 77, § 701, at 808; Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 73, at 1028-29.
83. See S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1983), reprintedin 1984 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News 3182, 3213 [hereinafter cited as Senate Report].
84. Pub. L. No. 89-465, 80 Stat. 214 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3152
(1982)), repealed by Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98
Stat. 1976.
85. See 18 U.S.C. § 3151 (1982) ("Nothing in this chapter shall interfere with or prevent the exercise by any court of the United States of its power to punish for contempt.")
repealed by Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat.
1976.
86. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 31413151 (West Supp. 1985)).
87. Senate Report, supra note 83, at 31, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News at 3214.
88. Based on the 1984 Act's changes to the 1966 Act, one could argue that Congress
abrogated the courts' power to punish flight as contempt. Before the 1984 Act, the relevant provisions on release after conviction were contained in Title 18 of the United States
Code. Section 3151 of chapter 207 provided that "[n]othing in this chapter shall interfere
with or prevent the exercise by any court of the United States of its power to punish for
contempt." Pub. L. No. 89-465, § 3(a), 80 Stat. 214, 216 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3151
(1982)), repealed by Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98
Stat. 1976. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
The Crime Control Act of 1984 changed chapter 207 in several significant respects.
First, § 3151, which recognized the court's general power to punish for contempt in connection with a violation of chapter 207, was repealed. Further, new § 3148, which identifies the sanctions for violation of a condition of release pending trial, was added. See 18
U.S.C.A. § 3148 (West Supp. 1985). The section specifies explicitly that violation of a
condition of release pending trial may be punished by contempt. See id. § 3148(a), (c).
Significantly, unlike new § 3148, new § 3146, which governs release after conviction,
makes no mention of the power to punish through contempt. See id. § 3146. Likewise,
the legislative history discusses punishment through contempt only in relation to § 3148,
see Senate Report, supra note 83, at 34, reprintedin 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at
3217, and mentions only the statutory penalties of fine, imprisonment and forfeiture in
relation to § 3146. See id., reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 3217.
Arguably, the 1984 changes to chapter 207 showed that Congress intended that the only
punishments to be imposed for failure to appear for sentencing following conviction were
those explicitly mentioned in § 3146. One could argue that to assume otherwise would
render Congress' elimination of former § 3151 and restructuring of sections 3146 and
3148 pointless-an improper assumption under well established canons of statutory construction. See, e.g., Uptagrafft v. United States, 315 F.2d 200, 204 (4th Cir.) (per curiam)
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Although the Crime Control Act broadly affirmed the courts' power to
punish flight as criminal contempt, Congress elsewhere has carefully defined and limited the courts' power to punish criminal contempt. Specifically, Congress has clearly identified the available contempt sanctions.
The contempt statute provides that a federal court "shall have power to
punish by fine or imprisonment, at its discretion, . . .contempt of its
authority."8 9
The courts have taken a literal approach to the contempt statute's
"fine or imprisonment" language. The history of the contempt statute
provides the basis for these narrow interpretations. Congress originally
sanctioned the federal courts' authority to punish for contempt in section
17 of the Judiciary Act of 1789.90 The language of the 1789 statute was
expansive. 9 1 To curb perceived abuses under the 1789 Act,92 Congress in
(Congress does not intend to enact "unnecessary statutory amendments"), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 818 (1963). Indeed, the 1984 changes give rise to a presumption that Congress
intended to change prior law. See, eg., Klein v. Republic Steel Corp., 435 F.2d 762, 76566 (3d Cir. 1970) (where "words of a later statute differ from those of a previous one on
the same or a related subject, the legislature must have intended them to have a different
meaning"); United States v. Crocker-Anglo Nat'l Bank, 277 F. Supp. 133, 155 (N.D. Cal.
1967) (if change occurs in legislative language, it is presumed that change was intended in
legislative result). If one were to accept these premises, the 1984 Act could be construed
to prohibit the judiciary from punishing a defendant for flight except in the manner prescribed by statute after successful prosecution by the government. Thus, punishment of a
fugitive through contempt proceedings would be improper.
Construing the 1984 Act to preclude the courts' exercise of their contempt power,
however, seems both unreasonable and unlikely. The contempt power is rooted principally in the judiciary's inherent power and is regarded as indispensable to the administration of justice. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court has
stated that while the contempt power "may be regulated within limits not precisely defined," it can "neither be abrogated nor rendered practically inoperative." Michaelson v.
United States ex reL Chi., St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 266 U.S. 42, 66 (1924). In light of these
principles, only a strained construction of the 1984 Act could support an implied abrogation of the courts' contempt power. Cf.United States v. Dickerson, 310 U.S. 554, 561
(1940) (where other persuasive evidence present, rule of statutory construction not infallible); see also McElroy v. United States, 455 U.S. 642, 651 n.14 (1982) (although a change
of statutory language is some indication of a change of purpose, "the inference of a
change of intent is only 'a workable rule of construction, not an infallible guide to legislative intent, and cannot overcome more persuasive evidence' ") (quoting United States v.
Dickerson, 310 U.S. 554, 561 (1940)).
Moreover, this conclusion is supported by decisions under the previous statutes expressly mentioning the contempt power. In United States v. Green, 241 F.2d 631 (2d Cir.
1957), afid, 356 U.S. 165 (1958), the court noted the 1954 bail statute's express reservation of the contempt power and observed that this clause merely acknowledged the
court's recognized power to punish. Id. at 633-34. It seems highly unlikely that Congress, by deleting express reference to the contempt power in the current statute, could be
deemed to impliedly eliminate that which it did not create.
89. 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1982) (emphasis added).
90. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 17, 1 Stat. 73, 83.
91. The statute provided that the federal courts "shall have power to ...punish by
fine or imprisonment, at the discretion of said courts, all contempts of authority in any
cause or hearing before the same ...."Id.
92. In 1826 Judge James Peck punished for contempt an attorney who had published
a critical article about the judge's conduct in a case then on appeal. See Bloom v. Illinois,
391 U.S. 194, 203 (1968); Nelles & King, Contempt by Publicationin the United States-
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1831 enacted the forerunner of the present contempt statute. 93 The Act
of 1831, which closely resembles the modem statute, 94 "substantially
curtailed" the previously undefined power of federal courts in matters of
criminal contempt."
In Ex parte Robinson,96 the Supreme Court upheld the Act of 1831,
concluding that although the power to punish for contempt is inherent in
the federal courts, this power may be and was limited by Congress.97
Significantly, the Supreme Court vacated the sanction of disbarment imposed by the trial court for contempt, because that sanction was neither a
"fine" nor "imprisonment" under the contempt statute and could not be
added to the punishments available for contempt. 98 The Court explained
that the contempt statute limits "the manner in which the power shall be
exercised, and must be held to be a negation of all other modes of
punishment." 99
Modem courts have continued to adhere to the restrictive interpretation of the contempt statute's "fine or imprisonment" language. For example, the Supreme Court has held that the statute forbids imposing
both fine and imprisonment because, under the statute, "the sentence
could only be a fine or imprisonment."'" A subsequent court of appeals
decision held that a fine and probation is likewise improper." ° '
If, as the case law makes clear, courts do not even have the power to
impose fine and imprisonment or fine and probation-mere variations of
the statutory punishment-they certainly lack the power to dismiss an
appeal and thereby substitute an entirely different form of punishment
from the one prescribed by Congress. 10 2 Arguably, courts need some
degree of flexibility in punishing contempt, and the contempt statute
should therefore be construed liberally to permit the imposition of fine
and imprisonment or fine and probation.10 3 Construing the statute to
To the Federal Contempt Statute, 28 Colum. L. Rev. 401, 423-30 (1928). This action
"triggered the beginining of a long struggle to confine the contempt power." Eash v.
Riggins Trucking Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 578 (3d Cir. 1985) (en banc) (Sloviter, J.,
dissenting).
93. Act of March 2, 1831, ch. 99, 4 Stat. 487 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 401
(1982)).
94. Eash v. Riggins Trucking Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 578 (3d Cir. 1985) (en banc)
(Sloviter, J., dissenting).
95. Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 203 (1968); Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33, 4748 (1941); see Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 73, at 1026-29.
96. 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505 (1874).
97. See id. at 510-11.
98. See id. at 512.
99. Id.
100. In re Bradley, 318 U.S. 50, 51 (1943) (emphasis in original).
101. See United States v. Temple, 372 F.2d 795, 799 (4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386
U.S. 961 (1967).
102. See Exparte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 512 (1874) (the statute "must be
held to be a negation of all other modes of punishment").
103. See, e.g., United States v. Temple, 372 F.2d 795, 800-01 (4th Cir. 1966) (Craven,
J., dissenting), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 961 (1967).
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permit dismissal of an appeal as punishment for contempt, however,
would not be a liberal interpretation; it would be a radical reinterpretation in complete disregard of the statutory language. The statute expressly mentions fine or imprisonment as the available sanctions and, as
the Supreme Court made clear in Robinson, other forms of punishment
not expressly mentioned are excluded."o Exclusion is further buttressed
by the practice of construing criminal statutes narrowly. 0 5 Because the
courts have refused to permit even slight variations from the "fine or
imprisonment" language, 0 6 and because dismissal of an appeal radically
departs from the statutorily prescribed punishment, 0 7 dismissal is not an
appropriate sanction for contempt. Therefore, the inherent power to
punish contempt cannot form the basis for dismissal of fugitives' appeals.

An additional reason compels the conclusion that the inherent power
to punish contempt is not the basis for dismissal in fugitive cases. Assuming that dismissal were an exercise of the contempt power, it would
be a punishment "summarily" imposed-without notice and hearing.
The courts' power to punish summarily is governed by Federal Rule of

Criminal Procedure 42(a), which specifies the limited circumstances in
which notice and a hearing may be eliminated:
A criminal contempt may be punished summarily if the judge certifies
that he saw or heard the conduct constituting the contempt and that it
was committed in the actual presence of the court. The order of contempt shall recite the facts and shall be signed by the judge and entered
of record.10 s

In all other instances, criminal contempt can be punished only on the
issuance of a notice, stating the time and place for a hearing and describ-

ing the facts constituting the criminal contempt. The notice must allow
104. See Exparte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 512 (1874).
105. See In re Osborne, 344 F.2d 611, 616 (9th Cir. 1965).
106. See supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text. The narrow interpretation of the
contempt statute's penalty provisions conforms with decisions on the judiciary's sentencing power in general. See Affronti v. United States, 350 U.S. 79, 83 (1955) (federal courts
have no authority to grant probation unless authorized to do so by Congress); Ex parte
United States, 242 U.S. 27, 41-42 (1916) (the authority to define and fix punishment for
crime is legislative and the authority to relieve from the punishment fixed by law belongs
to the executive; thus, federal courts have no inherent power to suspend execution of a
sentence); United States v. Cannon, 778 F.2d 747, 749 (11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam)
(where statute conditions granting of probation on entry of judgment of conviction, district court had no authority to withhold adjudication and impose probation or any other
sentence); United States v. Elkin, 731 F.2d 1005, 1010-11 (2d Cir.) (absent statutory authority, a court may not decline to impose a sentence), cerL denied, 105 S.Ct. 97 (1984).
107. See, e.g., Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 512 (1873) (courts have
power to punish contempt by fine or imprisonment; all other forms of punishment are
prohibited).
108. Fed. R. Crim. P. 42(a). Rule 42(a) is "'no more than a restatement of the law
existing when the Rule was adopted." United States v. Wilson, 421 U.S. 309, 317 (1975);
see Fed. R. Crim. P. 42 advisory committee note to subdivision (a) ("[tlhis rule is substantially a restatement of existing law").
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the defendant a reasonable time to prepare a defense. 109 At the hearing,
the prosecution bears the burden of establishing every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt."' The party charged with contempt is
afforded a right to be heard by way of defense or explanation,III a right
to counsel, 1 2 a right to be confronted with and to cross-examine the
witnesses against him, 13 and the right to produce evidence. 114 Further,
where the contumacious conduct is also a criminal offense-as is escape
from custody 15 - the right to trial by jury attaches."16
Because of the importance of the procedural protections normally afforded defendants in contempt proceedings, summary procedures under
Rule 42(a) are "reserved 'for exceptional circumstances.' "17 Hence,
courts have identified two "absolute prerequisites" to summary treat-

ment of contempt: the judge invoking Rule 42(a) must actually see or
hear the contumacious behavior, and the defendant must commit the
contempt in the actual presence of the court." 8 In addition to satisfying
these absolute prerequisites, the summary treatment must also comport
with the twofold justification of Rule 42(a)'s existence. Thus, unless the
defendant's conduct obstructs ongoing proceedings or threatens a judge
and so requires immediate and swift vindication of the court's authority, 119 and unless the judge is personally aware of the contumacious con109. Fed. R. Crim. P. 42(b); see Flight Eng'rs Int'l Ass'n v. Eastern Air Lines, 301
F.2d 756, 759 (5th Cir. 1962).
110. See In re Kave, 760 F.2d 343, 351 (1st Cir. 1985); United States v. Rylander, 714
F.2d 996, 1002 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2398 (1984); United States v.
Spectro Foods Corp., 544 F.2d 1175, 1183 (3d Cir. 1976).
111. See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 275 (1948).
112. See id.; Johnson v. United States, 344 F.2d 401, 411 (5th Cir. 1965).
113. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 275 (1948); see Matusow v. United States, 229 F.2d
335, 347 (5th Cir. 1956).
114. Offutt v. United States, 232 F.2d 69, 71 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 988
(1956); Hooley v. United States, 209 F.2d 219, 222-23 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S.
953 (1954).
115. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1073 (1982) (imposing penalty on any person who "moves
or travels in interstate or foreign commerce with intent ... to avoid ... custody or
confinement after conviction"); 18 U.S.C.A. § 3146 (West Supp. 1985) (imposing penalty
on any person who fails to appear for sentencing following conviction).
116. 18 U.S.C. § 3691 (1982); see United States v. Pyle, 518 F. Supp. 139, 146 (E.D.
Pa. 1981), affd mem., 722 F.2d 736 (3d Cir. 1983). The right to a jury trial also attaches
where the contempt is considered "serious"-subject to a sentence of more than six
months imprisonment. See Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506, 511-12 (1974).
117. Harris v. United States, 382 U.S. 162, 164 (1965) (quoting Brown v. United
States, 359 U.S. 41, 54 (1959) (Warren, C.J., dissenting), overruled, Harris v. United
States, 382 U.S. 162 (1965)); see, e.g., United States v. Baldwin, 770 F.2d 1550, 1554
(11th Cir. 1985); United States v. Flynt, 756 F.2d 1352, 1363 (9th Cir. 1985); Vaughn v.
City of Flint, 752 F.2d 1160, 1169 (6th Cir. 1985).
118. United States v. Flynt, 756 F.2d 1352, 1363 (9th Cir. 1985); In re Gustafson, 650
F.2d 1017, 1021 (9th Cir. 1981) (en banc); see United States v. Wilson, 421 U.S. 309, 315
(1975); United States v. Martin-Trigona, 759 F.2d 1017, 1024 (2d Cir. 1985).
119. United States v. Wilson, 421 U.S. 309, 315-16 (1975); Harris v. United States, 382
U.S. 162, 164 (1965); see Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 306-07 (1888).
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duct thereby eliminating the need for a hearing,' 2 0 summary procedure is
12

improper. 1
Dismissing the appeals of fugitives, or former fugitives, as punishment
for contempt neither satisfies the absolute prerequisites of, nor comports
with the underlying justifications for, summary contempt proceedings.
When defendants flee after filing a notice of appeal, the contumacious
conduct could be viewed as occurring in the presence of the court,'2 but
it is not conduct of which the judge is personally aware. Indeed, in Molinaro the Court did not become aware of the appellant's flight until counsel for the defendant and the state so informed the court."
Regarding
defendants who flee before filing a notice of appeal, neither the "actual
presence" nor "personal awareness" requirements are met. The conduct
is not in the court's presence because the appellate court has no jurisdiction until a notice of appeal has been filed,' 2 4 and an act committed
before the court even acquired jurisdiction could hardly be classified as
occurring within the court's presence.' 25 For the same reason, the court
lacks personal knowledge of the defendant's conduct. Therefore,
120. United States v. Flynt, 756 F.2d 1352, 1363 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v.
Marshall, 451 F.2d 372, 374-75, 377 (9th Cir. 1971) (per curiam).
121. See United States v. Baldwin, 770 F.2d 1550, 1553-54 (11th Cir. 1985); United
States v. Flynt, 756 F.2d 1352, 1363 (9th Cir. 1985).
122. Cf. In re Gates, 478 F.2d 998, 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (per curiam) (failure to
appear in court at time set for trial was within the rule permitting summary punishment

for direct contempt "in the actual presence of the court"); In re Niblack, 476 F.2d 930,
931-33 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam) (failure of lawyer to appear in court at the time set was
contempt in presence of the court), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 909 (1973). But see United

States v. Onu, 730 F.2d 253, 254 (5th Cir.) (failure of a lawyer to appear for a trial is not
contempt committed in the presence of the court), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 182 (1984); In
re Allis, 531 F.2d 1391, 1392 (9th Cir. 1976) (tardiness of counsel in appearing at scheduled hearing is not necessarily punishable summarily as conduct committed in court's
presence; the reasons for the absence must be examined), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 900
(1976).
123. See Molinaro, 396 U.S. at 365.
124. See Elfman Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 567 F.2d 1252, 1253 (3d Cir. 1977)
(per curiam); Martin v. United States, 263 F.2d 516, 517 (10th Cir. 1959) (per curiam);
Donovan v. Esso Shipping Co., 259 F.2d 65, 68 (3d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 907
(1959).
125. See Ex parte Bradley, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 364, 371-72 (1869) (judges of the Supreme
Court of the District of Columbia exceeded their authority in punishing lawyer for contempt committed before the criminal court of the district); Ex parte Tillinghast, 29 U.S.
(4 Pet.) 108, 109 (1830) ("this Court does not consider itself authorised to punish here for
contempts which may have been committed in [the District Court]"); Merchants' Stock
& Grain Co. v. Board of Trade, 201 F. 20, 27 (8th Cir. 1912) (a court has exclusive
jurisdiction to punish contempts of its authority; no change of venue can be allowed); cf.
Letts v. Icarian Dev. Co., No. 74-C-2252, slip op. at 11, 16-19 (N.D. I1l. Sept. 15, 1980)
(power to punish contempt "resides only in the court against which the contempt is committed;" however, by refiling false affidavits initially filed in another court, defendant was
guilty of contempt in the second court) (available in the files of the Fordham Law Review); In re Steiner, 195 F. 299, 301 (S.D.N.Y. 1912) (district court noted that "only the
court whose authority is contemned has the right to punish for the offense" but then said
that given an act of Congress abolishing the circuit court, it must act in place of the
circuit court).
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whether dismissal is based on flight before or after filing a notice of ap-

peal, the court's summary disposition of the matter would not comply
with the requirements of summary contempt proceedings.

Because dismissing the defendant's appeal would be both procedurally
improper and an improper sanction for contempt, the federal courts' inherent power to punish contempt cannot be the basis for dismissal of

fugitives' or former fugitives' appeals. Dismissal must be pursuant to an
inherent power on which Congress has imposed fewer restraints and over
which the courts have greater latitude and control. The courts' inherent
power to control their dockets and manage their own affairs is one such
power.
2.

The Courts' Inherent Power to Control Their Dockets and

Manage Their Own Affairs
Federal courts have the inherent power to impose a variety of sanctions in order to regulate their dockets, promote judicial efficiency or
deter frivolous filings. 126 This power is governed "by the control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs."' 27 In appropriate
circumstances, dismissal
of an action is a proper sanction to impose pur2
suant to this power.' 1
a. Dismissal Based on Lack of "Mutuality"
In Smith, Bonahan and Molinaro, the defendants' escape during the
pendency of their appeals deprived the court of the ability to enforce an
adverse judgment.129 In Smith and Bonahan, dismissal was contingent
on the defendant's failure to return to custody within a specified time. 3
126. Moulton v. Commissioner, 733 F.2d 734, 735 (10th Cir. 1984) (per curiam); see
Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962); Eash v. Riggins Trucking Inc., 757
F.2d 557, 563, 567 (3d Cir. 1985) (en banc); Barnd v. City of Tacoma, 664 F.2d 1339,
1342 (9th Cir. 1982); Penthouse Int'l, Ltd. v. Playboy Enter., Inc., 663 F.2d 371, 386 (2d
Cir. 1981); see also Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764-65 (1980) (courts
have inherent power to levy sanctions "in response to abusive litigation practices"), superseded on other grounds by Pub. L. No. 96-349, 94 Stat. 1156 (1980) (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1982)); Resnik, ManagerialJudges, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 376,
396 n.80 (1982) ("Federal courts have inherent power to make rules for the orderly conduct of their business."); Richey, A Modern Management Techniquefor Trial Courts to
Improve the Quality of Justice: Requiring Direct Testimony to be Submitted in Written
Form Priorto Trial, 72 Geo. L.J. 73, 75 (1983) ("In short, a court's inherent powers are
those that it may call upon to aid in the exercise of its jurisdiction, the administration of
justice, and the preservation of its independence and integrity.").
127. Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 630 (1962); see Eash v. Riggins Trucking
Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 567 (3d Cir. 1985) (en bane).
128. See National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639,
643 (1976) (per curiam); Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 629-33 (1962); Fjelstad V.
American Honda Motor Co., 762 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9th Cir. 1985); Wyle v. R.J. Reynolds
Indus., 709 F.2d 585, 589 (9th Cir. 1983); see also Phoceene Sous-Marine, S.A. v. United
States Phosmarine, Inc., 682 F.2d 802, 806 (9th Cir. 1982) (although courts have power
to dismiss an action, the power is limited by requirements of due process).
129. See supra notes 9-32 and accompanying text.
130. See supra text accompanying notes 13 and 17.
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Those decisions, therefore, stand on solid ground; the dismissal of an
appeal for the appellant's failure to obey a direct order of the appellate
court is firmly established. 3 '
In contrast, dismissal in Molinaro was ordered immediately after the
Court was notified of the appellant's flight.13 2 Because the Court issued
no order of return, dismissal was based on the appellant's fugitive status,
rather than his disobedience of an appellate court order. Thus, the propriety of dismissal in Molinaro depends on whether promoting the principle of "mutuality"-the notion that the sovereign should benefit from a
judgment in its favor as readily as the defendant should benefit from a
successful appeal' 33-falls within the appellate courts' inherent judicial
power to manage their own affairs.
Under the facts in Molinaro, dismissal seems justified. Although
courts have been rather imprecise in articulating the exact rationale, the
justifiability of dismissal seems completely unquestionable in light of the
utter reasonableness of the rule Molinaro established: a defendant invoking the resources of the appellate court must not, by escaping from custody, deprive the court of its ability to enforce an adverse judgment. I4
A contrary rule would make a mockery of the appellate process and
would encourage defendants to flee so as to enjoy the benefits of both a
successful escape and, if the appeal were allowed to proceed in absentia, a
successful appeal.135 Thus, preventing flight by appellants is necessary to
preserve the court's ability to enforce adverse judgments and to maintain
orderly appellate procedures.' 3 6
b. Dismissal Based on Flight Before Seeking Appellate Review
Although the justifiability of dismissing the appeal of a defendant who
flees after seeking appellate review seems clear, the reasons for dismissing
the appeal of one who flees before invoking the resources of the appellate
court and who is no longer a fugitive at the time of initiating appellate
review are less obvious. Because the defendant has returned to custody,
the mutuality principle is satisfied.' 3 7 Further, because the defendant
131. See Annot., 49 A.L.R.2d 1425, 1428 (1956) ("with respect to the question
whether an appeal may be dismissed where the appellant has failed to obey an order
issued by the appellate court, the courts in all jurisdictions in which the issue has arisen
have been virtually unanimous in holding that dismissal is warranted, even if not
mandatory") (footnotes omitted).
132. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
133. See supra notes 24 and 28.
134. See supra notes 25-32 and accompanying text.
135. See supra notes 24 and 28.
136. Cf. United States v. Hall, 472 F.2d 261, 265 (5th Cir. 1972) (district court has
inherent power to punish for criminal contempt a nonparty to a school desegregation case
who violates a court order; the "disruptive conduct would not only jeopardize the effect
of the court's judgment already entered but would also undercut its power to enter binding desegregation orders in the future").
137. See, eg., United States v. Shapiro, 391 F. Supp. 689, 693 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (where
counsel represented to the court that the defendant would surrender even if a threshold
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fled before invoking appellate jurisdiction, the integrity of the appellate
process is not necessarily implicated. 3 ' Finally, the appellate court has
139
issued no order that the defendant has disobeyed.
Under these circumstances, even the amorphous notion of the courts'
inherent power to manage their own affairs does not readily justify dismissal." The uncertainty arises because activities occurring before the
filing of the notice
of appeal may not qualify as the appellate court's
"own affairs." 4 ' This doubt can only be removed by determining the
extent to which the courts' power to manage their own affairs can be
construed to extend to managing the affairs of the judicial system as a
whole. With this broad view of the courts' inherent power in mind, several possible justifications for dismissal of former fugitives' appeals
emerge.
i. Disobedience of a Trial Court Order
While the law is well established that dismissal of an appeal is permissible for disobedience of an appellate court order, 42 courts disagree on
43
whether dismissal is proper for disobedience of a trial court order.
Many courts have authorized dismissal in these circumstances, however,
jurisdictional issue were decided against him, the court was convinced there was mutuality and therefore agreed to hear the defendant's claim); see also Barker v. Jones, 668 F.2d
154, 155 (2d Cir. 1982) ("When an appellant has been returned to the jurisdiction of the
court before the appeal is dismissed ...he has not necessarily lost his rights" to an
appeal) (emphasis in original); Ruetz v. Lash, 500 F.2d 1225, 1230 (7th Cir. 1974) (when
appellant had been returned to jurisdiction of the court before dismissal of his appeal,
request for appeal should not have been dismissed); cf. Williams v. Holbrook, 691 F.2d 3,
13 (1st Cir. 1982) ("We believe the district court erred in applying these holdings, without qualification, to the question of petitioner's right in a successive petition to seek
habeas corpus relief, after her return to custody.") (emphasis added).
138. See, e.g., United States v. London, 723 F.2d 1538, 1540-41 (11th Cir.) (Johnson,
J., dissenting), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 2684 (1984). See also supra notes 124-25.
139. Cf United States v. Snow, 748 F.2d 928, 930 (4th Cir. 1984) (appellant's return to
custody before court issued order requiring his surrender militated against dismissal).
140. The notion of inherent power has been described as "nebulous," and its bounds
"shadowy," see R. Rodes, K. Ripple & C. Mooney, Sanctions Imposable for Violation of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, at 179 n.466 (Fed. Judicial Center 1981); Rosenberg, Sanctions to Effectuate PretrialDiscovery, 58 Colum. L. Rev. 480, 485 (1958) (quoting Committee on Administration of Justice of the State Bar of Cal., Report on
Discovery, 31 Cal. State B.J. 204, 206 (1956)); see also Levin & Amsterdam, supra note
74, at 33 ("We recognize that the outer boundaries of this sphere of total judicial autonomy have been difficult to locate with precision."). One recent case explained that this
confusion stems, first, from the virtual dearth of federal decisions discussing the topic in
any detail and, second, from the failure of the decisions that have discussed inherent
powers to distinguish between different types of court powers. See Eash v. Riggins
Trucking Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 561-62 (3d Cir. 1985) (en banc). See supra note 74.
141. The appellate court has no jurisdiction until the notice of appeal is filed. See
supra note 124 and accompanying text.
142. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Beemer v. Beemer, 200 Pa. Super. 103, 106-07,
188 A.2d 475, 477 (1962) (quoting Annot., supra note 131, at 1428). See supra note 131
and accompanying text.
143. See, e.g., Stewart v. Stewart, 91 Ariz. 356, 358, 372 P.2d 697, 699 (1962) (en
banc); Gazil v. Gazil, 343 So. 2d 595, 596 (Fla. 1977) (quoting Annot., supra note 131, at
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on the ground that permitting one who has flouted the orders of the
courts to seek judicial assistance conflicts with the principles of justice.I"
By the very act of becoming a fugitive, the former fugitive
has nor46
1 45
mally disobeyed a trial court order to appear at sentencing,

at trial,

or at some other proceeding at the trial level. Thus, under the rationale
that disobedience of any judicial order, including that of the trial court,
should disentitle the defendant to appellate review, dismissal would be
proper. Such a result, however, seems too broad. The district court can
impose contempt sanctions on defendants who disobey its orders 4 7 and
does not require the assistance of the appellate court to vindicate its authority. 14 8 Further, the appellate process is not necessarily harmed by
the failure to obey a trial court order. 4 9 Thus, the appellate court lacks
a compelling reason to dismiss the appeal, and only if the court's inherent power to manage its own affairs is read most broadly to include the
affairs of the entire judicial branch does the appellate court have the
power to dismiss. In the absence of any impact on the appellate process,
this broad reading probably overstates the courts' inherent power of dismissal, since exercise of the dismissal power is not "necessary" to the
exercise of any other power.' 50

Given the apparent lack of necessity for appellate court action, and in
light of the appellate courts' questionable authority to dismiss for violation of a trial court order, dismissing an appeal based on disobedience of
1429); Shannon v. Shannon, 680 S.W.2d 367, 372 n.1 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (dictum);
Annot., supra note 131, at 1429.
144. See Keidaish v. Smith, 400 So. 2d 90, 91 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (per curiam);
Commonwealth ex rel. Beemer v. Beemer, 200 Pa. Super. 103, 106-07, 188 A.2d 475, 47778 (1962); Annot., supra note 131, at 1430 & n.19. But see State v. Ralph Williams'
N. W. Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 87 Wash. 2d 298, 310-11, 553 P.2d 423, 433 (1976) (en
banc) (court refused to dismiss appeal "because of the nature and significance of the
action"), appeal dismissed, 430 U.S. 952 (1977).
145. See, e.g., United States v. Holmes, 680 F.2d 1372, 1373 (11th Cir. 1982) (per
curiam), cerL denied, 460 U.S. 1015 (1983).
146. See, e.g., United States v. London, 723 F.2d 1538, 1538 (1lth Cir.), cert. denied,
104 S. Ct. 2684 (1984).
147. See, eg., United States v. Green, 241 F.2d 631, 632, 635 (2d Cir. 1957) (upholding a sentence of three years' imprisonment for criminal contempt imposed by district
court to punish the defendants for their failure to surrender in accordance with the district court's post-conviction order).
148. See United States v. Baccollo, 725 F.2d 170, 172 (2d Cir. 1983) ("We are aware
that the defendant's deliberate defiance of the district court [by absconding during trial]
deserves punishment. We are also mindful that there are or were available other customary remedies (such as punishment for contempt), and that they may be more suitable
than is the loss of the right to appeal on the ground of pre-judgment conduct."); cf.
Annot., 99 A.L.R.2d 1100, 1104 (1965) ("Since most American courts have adequate
power to deal with their own contempts, there is no American doctrine permitting a
higher court to punish for contempts against an inferior court .... ); id. at 1139 (under
American practice, most courts have power to punish for contempt and no supervisory
court need be involved). See supra notes 124-25.
149. See United States v. London, 723 F.2d 1538, 1540 (11th Cir.) (Johnson, J., dissenting), cerL denied, 467 U.S. 1228 (1984).
150. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
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a trial court order alone is an insufficient basis on which courts can disregard their "virtually unflagging obligation.., to exercise the jurisdiction
given them."15 Therefore, some other rationale justifying the dismissal
of former fugitives' appeals must be found.
ii.

Disruption of Judicial Proceedings

In London, the court stated that dismissal was justified because, by
fleeing in the midst of trial, "the defendant disrupted a prolonged trial
and flaunted his disregard for ... orderly court procedures."' 5 2 Dismissal, therefore, was not based solely on the defendant's violation of a trial
court order. Rather, the court also relied on the actual disruption of a
judicial proceeding caused by the defendant's flight.
While the London court's reliance on actual disruption of court proceedings in addition to disobedience of a trial court order provides some
added support for dismissal, this rationale still seems inadequate. The
same reasons that warrant against dismissal based solely on disobedience
of a trial court order also militate against dismissal here. The trial court
still has the contempt power at its disposal, 15 3 and the appellate process
is not necessarily harmed by a disturbance at the trial level. 154 Thus, the
appellate courts' obligation to exercise their jurisdiction' 5 5 should also
prevent dismissal of an appeal based on disruption of judicial proceedings
that have no apparent impact on the appellate process.
iii.

Delay in Appellate Review

A careful reading of Holmes reveals that the true basis for its holding
was the court's concern over the delay in the administration of justice
caused by a defendant's escape from custody.' 5 6 In Holmes, the defend151. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817
(1976). See supra notes 61-70 and accompanying text.
152. See London, 723 F.2d at 1539.
153. See supra notes 147-48 and accompanying text.
154. See London, 723 F.2d at 1540 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
155. See supra notes 61-70 and accompanying text.
156. The government's argument further demonstrates that the length of the delay was
the basis for the Holmes court's decision to extend Molinaro to cases involving flight
before the filing of the appeal. The government argued that the reasons for dismissal of
an appeal for flight after conviction but before sentencing were just as compelling as those
justifying dismissal for flight during the pendency of the appeal. This argument, however, was predicated on the length of the delay caused by the defendant's flight:
The Government contends that just as the defendants in [United States v.
Shelton, 508 F.2d 787 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 828 (1975)] and [United

States v. Smith, 544 F.2d 832 (5th Cir. 1977) (per curiam)], who were not permitted to appeal when they had been fugitives for eighteen months following
conviction, this defendant, who was a fugitive for two years, should likewise be
held to have abandoned his appeal.
Brief of Appellee at 14, United States v. Holmes, 680 F.2d 1372 (11th Cir. 1982) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1015 (1983).
Further support for the position that delay is the principal concern in cases such as
Holmes is provided by the 1984 amendments to the provisions on penalties for flight. The
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ant's flight caused a delay of two years in sentencing and in the commencement of appellate review. Accordingly, the court held that the
right to appeal a criminal conviction may be waived "through flight
which may postpone filing a notice of appeal for years after conviction.
Such untimeliness would make a meaningful appeal impossible in many
cases. In case of a reversal, the government would
obviously be
15s7
prejudiced in locating witnesses and retrying the case."
Holmes makes clear that concern over delay is a legitimate basis for
dismissing a former fugitive's appeal in two instances. First, dismissal is
appropriate where the delay is so long-several years-that a "meaningful appeal" is "impossible." ' Second, dismissal is proper where the delay would prejudice the government's efforts in retrying the case if the
appellant achieves a reversal and retrial becomes necessary.' 5 9 If either
of these situations exists, the defendant has waived the right to an appeal.
Dismissal based on the first detrimental effect of delay-preventing a
meaningful appeal-has serious limits. The very fact that the court qualified its statement by noting that delay precludes a meaningful appeal "in
many cases,"' rather than all cases, demonstrates that the court did not

lay down a blanket rule of dismissal. Such equivocation suggests that
careful review of the circumstances is necessary to ascertain whether a
meaningful appeal really is impossible to achieve.'
Furthermore,
revised flight sanctions nearly parallel the penalties for the underlying offense for which
the defendant was released. The amendments were motivated by Congress' concern over
the damaging effect delay could have on the successful prosecution of cases. See Senate
Report, supra note 83, at 31, reprintedin 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 3214.
157. Holmes, 680 F.2d at 1374.
158. Idr; cf. Estrada v. United States, 585 F.2d 742, 742-43 (5th Cir. 1978) (per
curiam) (after filing appeal defendant became a fugitive for three and one-half years;
court denied request to reinstate appeal); United States v. Smith, 544 F.2d 832, 833-34
(5th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (defendant remained a fugitive for 18 months; court denied
request to reinstate appeal); United States v. Shelton, 508 F.2d 797, 798-99 (5th Cir.)
(defendant rearrested 18 months after flight; appeal dismissed), cerL denied, 423 U.S. 828
(1975). See generally United States v. Snow, 748 F.2d 928, 930 (4th Cir. 1984) (citing
Holmes for the proposition that "[d]ismissals have occurred when the fugitive has failed
to return to custody... within two years of an escape").
159. See United States v. Holmes, 680 F.2d 1372, 1374 (11th Cir. 1982) (per curiam)
("In case of a reversal, the government would obviously be prejudiced in locating witnesses and retrying the case."), cert denied, 460 U.S. 1015 (1983); see also United States
v. Baccollo, 725 F.2d 170, 172 (2d Cir. 1983) (observing that "the two-year deliberate
flight and absence of defendant ... would gravely prejudice the government were the
defendant successful on his appeal .... During the lost two years witnesses, through
death or other cause, and other evidence may have become unavailable to the government") (emphasis deleted).
160. See United States v. Holmes, 680 F.2d 1372, 1374 (11th Cir. 1982) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1015 (1983).
161. The language of the Holmes court is, in some parts of the opinion, sufficiently
absolute to suggest that the court intended to establish an automatic rule of dismissal for
fugitives' appeals. See id. at 1373 ("We hold that a defendant who flees after conviction,
but before sentencing, waives his right to appeal from the conviction unless he can establish that his absence was due to matters completely beyond his control."); id. at 1374
("We hold that Holmes, by becoming a fugitive following his convictions, abandoned his
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viewed from the defendant's perspective, any appeal would be meaningful when compared with the alternative of dismissal. For example, federal habeas corpus relief, when granted, frequently is obtained many
years after conviction. 162 Despite the delay, the court would surely be
hard pressed to find any successful petitioner who would describe the
long awaited relief as meaningless.
In view of these limitations, the Holmes court's suggestion that delay
may render a meaningful appeal impossible seems to be focused more on
the systemic concern over the disruption of appellate review than on the
defendant's concern with obtaining relief. The London case supports this
interpretation by explaining that the basis for dismissal in Holmes was
the fugitive's disruption of "the sentencing process and appellate review."' 163 Thus, the meaningfulness of an appeal is apparently undermined by a lengthy delay that creates a disruptive hiatus between
conviction and appellate review. In some cases the delay itself may be
the disruptive force; 164 in other cases, the disruption may be exacerbated
by other factors, such as the prevention of a consolidation of the fugitive's appeal with the appeals of codefendants who did not flee.' 65 In any
right to pursue this appeal."). The interpretation of Holmes in the text of this Article,
however, comports with the federal courts' well established view that dismissal under
Molinaro, on which Holmes relied, is discretionary, not mandatory. See, e.g., United
States v. Snow, 748 F.2d 928, 930 (4th Cir. 1984); United States v. Shelton, 482 F.2d 848,
849 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1075 (1973); United States v. Swigart,
490 F.2d 914, 915 (10th Cir. 1973); see also United States v. Veliotis, 586 F. Supp. 1512,
1514 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) ("Both parties concede that this matter resides within the sound
discretion of the Court."); Lewis v. Delaware State Hosp., 490 F. Supp. 177, 182 (D. Del.
1980) ("federal appeals courts in almost every circuit have recognized ... [a] policy of
discretionary as opposed to jurisdictional, i e., mandatory, determination of the status of
appeals of fugitives") (citations omitted); United States v. Lockwood, 382 F. Supp. 1111,
1117 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) ("Molinaro represents the well known proposition that an appellate court may, in its discretion, refuse to hear a case in which a defendant has fled the
jurisdiction.") (emphasis in original); cf Hitchcock v. Laird, 456 F.2d 1064, 1065 (4th
Cir. 1972) (per curiam) (although not citing Molinaro, court noted it was dismissing appeal of army deserter "with leave ... to reinstate").
162. See, e.g., Alexander v. Maryland, 719 F.2d 1241, 1246-47 (4th Cir. 1983) (granting writ more than 20 years after conviction); Lewellyn v. Wainwright, 593 F.2d 15, 1617 (5th Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (granting writ nine years after conviction); United States
ex rel. Craig v. Myers, 220 F. Supp. 762, 763 (E.D. Pa. 1963) (granting writ more than 30
years after conviction), affid, 329 F.2d 856 (3d Cir. 1964); cf. McDonnell v. Estelle, 666
F.2d 246, 249, 253-55 (5th Cir. 1982) (defendant filing writ 26 years after conviction
would not necessarily be barred; state must prove prejudice resulting from delay).
163. London, 723 F.2d at 1539.
164. See, e.g., Holmes, 680 F.2d at 1374; see also London, 723 F.2d at 1539 (explaining
Holmes); United States v. Baccollo, 725 F.2d 170, 171 (2d Cir. 1983) (government's argument is that allowing appeal of defendant who fled during jury deliberations would place
"an unfair burden on the government because it would be forced to retry a complicated
and lengthy case largely dependent on the testimony of ... witnesses who might not be
available").
165. Although the court in London failed to consider this point, the defendant's flight
in that case prevented consolidation of his appeal with those of six of his codefendants.
See United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 985 & n.1 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457
U.S. 1136 (1982). See supra note 53.
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66
event, the totality of the circumstances should be examined.1
The second detrimental effect of delay-prejudice to the governmentalso has its limits. As the Holmes court explained, delay would prejudice
the government because, on reversal, the government would have to retry
an old case and relocate witnesses.1 67 Reversal, however, does not always result in a new trial. For example, if the appellate court determines
that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction, a judgment
6
of acquittal is entered and double jeopardy principles bar retrial.' 1
Therefore, in evaluating the prejudice to the government, the court must
consider the nature of the claims raised and relief sought by the
169
appellant.
Despite these limits, the delay caused by the defendant's flight appears
to be a much more formidable basis for dismissal than mere disobedience
of a trial court order or disruption of trial court proceedings. Only the
appellate court can evaluate the effect delay will have on appellate review
and the prejudice it may cause to the government. Further, delay implicates the integrity of the appellate process because the court's focus is on
the disruption of appellate review, rather than trial proceedings, and because the prejudice to the government, if any, flows directly from the
relief ordered by the appellate court-a new trial. Given this link between the defendant's flight and the interests of the appellate system,
under proper circumstances dismissal based on delay appears to be
within the appellate courts' inherent power to "manage their own affairs," despite the courts' failure to exercise their congressionally conferred jurisdiction.

III.

RECOMMENDED APPROACH TO FUGITIVES' AND FORMER
FUGITIVES' APPEALS

Because federal courts have a "virtually unflagging obligation" to exercise their appellate jurisdiction," 0 and because the exercise of an inherent
power is proper only if necessary to the exercise of all others,"' courts
should be more circumspect in dismissing criminal appeals based on the
defendant's flight. In particular, courts should distinguish between defendants who flee after filing a notice of appeal and are not in custody at
the time the government moves for dismissal-fugitives-and defendants
who flee before seeking appellate review and are within custody at all
times during the pendency of their appeal-former fugitives.1 7 a As to
166. See infra notes 175-97 and accompanying text.
167. See United States v. Baccollo, 725 F.2d 170, 171-72 (2d Cir. 1983); Holmes, 680
F.2d at 1374.
168. See Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 18 (1978). See also supra note 22 and
accompanying text.
169. See infra text accompanying note 196.
170. See supra notes 61-70 and accompanying text.
171. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
172. Cf. Barker v. Jones, 668 F.2d 154, 155 (2d Cir. 1982) (per se dismissal rule applies
to fugitives, but not to former fugitives).
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fugitives, a bright line rule of unconditional dismissal with prejudice is
appropriate, since the appellant's flight is a direct affront to the appellate
court and jeopardizes the viability of the appellate system. 173 As to former fugitives, however, the integrity and viability of the appellate court
are not necessarily implicated.17 4 Therefore, courts should adopt a more

flexible balancing test in considering whether to dismiss a former fugitive's appeal, taking into consideration the following factors.
A.

Voluntary Versus Involuntary Return

To the extent that delay is the basis for dismissing a former fugitive's
appeal, the voluntariness or involuntariness of a former fugitive's return
to custody is, arguably, irrelevant.' 75 Whether the defendant surrenders
or is recaptured, the length and effect of the delay caused by flight is the
same. Surrender, however, is relevant as a matter of public policy. One
stated purpose of dismissing appeals of fugitives and former fugitives is to
deter others from similarly fleeing. 76 By the same token, the law should
encourage--or at least not discourage-fugitives' voluntary return to
custody.' 77 Therefore, a former fugitive's voluntary surrender should
weigh in favor of entertaining his appeal.
B.

The Nature of the ErrorAsserted

In any criminal appeal, the nature of the error asserted affects both the
standard of review and, occasionally, the reviewability of the appellant's
claims. For example, many alleged errors will not warrant reversal unless the appellant can show that the trial court abused its discretion. 178
Further, in many cases the absence of a contemporaneous objection will
173. See supra notes 129-36 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 138, 147-48, 153-54 and accompanying text.
175. See, e.g., Bonahan v. Nebraska, 125 U.S. 692, 692 (1887) (indicating that defendant's surrender or recapture would prevent dismissal of his appeal). But see United States
v. Snow, 748 F.2d 928, 930 (4th Cir. 1984) (defendant's recapture might be a factor
against him in his request for appeal).
176. See Estelle v. Dorrough, 420 U.S. 534, 537 (1975) (per curiam); see also United
States v. Snow, 748 F.2d 928, 930 (4th Cir. 1984) (fact that defendant "did not voluntarily surrender" and was "recaptured against his will... militates against granting [appellant] a judicial forum where he can contest the terms and conditions of his sentence").
177. See Gonzales v. Stover, 575 F.2d 827, 827-28 (10th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) ("For
over 100 years the Supreme Court has consistently refused to grant post-conviction review for escaped prisoners. These decisions make it clear that the Court's informal policy
is grounded on considerations which favor voluntary surrender and discourage escape.")
(citations omitted).
178. See, e.g., United States v. Pruitt, 763 F.2d 1256, 1263 (11th Cir. 1985) ("grant or
denial of a motion for severance lies within the discretion of the trial court and is reviewable only for abuse of discretion"), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 856 (1986); United States v.
Rasmussen, 642 F.2d 165, 167 (5th Cir. 1981) (refusal to allow defendant's withdrawal of
guilty pleas within discretion of court); United States v. Kelly, 569 F.2d 928, 937 (5th
Cir.) (denial of motion for continuance does not constitute abuse of discretion), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 829 (1978).
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limit the court's review only to claims constituting "plain error."179

The nature of the error asserted should also influence the court's decision to dismiss a former fugitive's appeal. In a situation analogous to the
question of dismissal of former fugitive's appeals, the District Court for
the Southern District of New York in United States v. Veliotis' 8 o gave
some weight to this factor. In Veliotis, the defendant fled the jurisdiction
before the government filed an indictment charging him with various offenses in an alleged kick-back scheme. The government claimed that, if
convicted, the defendant would have to forfeit all stock he owned in a
corporation implicated in the scheme.18 Therefore, the government obtained a restraining order preventing the defendant from disposing of his
stock in the corporation. Appearing through his attorney, the fugitive
defendant sought removal of the restraining order on the ground that the
due process clause required a prompt post-seizure hearing."8 2
Relying on the Molinaro line of cases, the government urged the court
to refuse to hear the defendant's motion because he was a fugitive. 8 3
After careful analysis of the rationale of Molinaro and its progeny, the
court rejected the government's argument and entertained the defendant's motion. 184 Among the factors the court considered was the constitutional nature of the defendant's claim. Having noted at the outset of its
opinion that hearing a fugitive's motion was discretionary,18 5 the court
found that "where a fugitive defendant seeks to vindicate a right vouchsafed by the United States Constitution, the Court should give weight to
this factor in determining how to exercise its discretion."'18 6
The appellate courts should likewise give weight to the constitutional
nature of a former fugitive's claims in deciding whether to dismiss an
appeal. 87 In this regard, the plain error standard may prove useful. The
179. The "plain error" standard was laid down in United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S.
157 (1936):

In exceptional circumstances, especially in criminal cases, appellate courts, in
the public interest, may, of their own motion, notice errors to which no exception has been taken, if the errors are obvious, or if they otherwise seriously
affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.
Id. at 160. It was later codified in Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). See United States v. Young,
105 S. Ct. 1038, 1042 (1985). The basis for Rule 52(b), however, extends back to law
established since the last century. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b) advisory committee note
(indicating that the rule restated existing law as set forth by the Supreme Court in Wiborg v. United States, 163 U.S. 632, 658-59 (1896)).
180. 586 F. Supp. 1512 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
181. The Government contended that the stock would be subject to forfeiture as a
penalty under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1963(a)(2) (1982). See United States v. Veliotis, 586 F. Supp. 1512, 1513 (S.D.N.Y.
1984).
182. United States v. Veliotis, 586 F. Supp. 1512, 1514 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
183. Id.
184. See id.at 1517.
185. See id.at 1514.

186. Id. at 1515; see also id. at 1517 ("In light of the constitutional nature of [defendant's] claim ... it [is] appropriate to entertain the motion.").
187. See, eg., United States v. Tunnell, 650 F.2d 1124, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 1981) (fact
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plain error doctrine creates an exception to the contemporaneous objection rule that permits the appellate courts to correct egregious errors occurring at trial even though they were not brought to the attention of the
trial court."' 8 The plain error doctrine is inherently a balancing test intended to encourage defendants to permit the trial judge to correct any
errors in the first instance, while at the same time permitting appellate
courts to redress "errors that 'seriously affect the fairness, integrity or
public reputation of judicial proceedings.' "I"

Similar factors are implicated in the decision to dismiss a former fugitive's appeal. On one hand, the appellate court should adopt an approach that will discourage defendants from fleeing. 190 On the other
hand, a strict application of the dismissal doctrine could result in a gross
miscarriage of justice. 191 The constitutional nature of a former fugitive's

claim, therefore, should be a factor in a court's decision on dismissal, and
a claimed error that satisfies92 the "plain error" standard should weigh
strongly in favor of review.1
C.

The Length and Effect of Delay

Because the delay in the administration of justice caused by the dethat defendant absconded after conviction and did not reappear for sentencing until 12
years later did not justify dismissal of his appeal where convictions may have been based
on unconstitutional presumption); United States v. Tapia-Lopez, 521 F.2d 582, 583-84
(9th Cir. 1975) (per curiam) (reversing conviction where unconstitutional jury instruction
was given despite fact that appellant escaped after conviction and was not sentenced until
after she reappeared five years later); see also United States v. Gordon, 538 F.2d 914, 915
(1st Cir. 1976) (per curiam) (dictum) (reviewing defendant's claims despite his flight and
noting that "no manifest injustice occurred in appellant's conviction"), cert. denied, 441

U.S. 936 (1979).
188. United States v. Young, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 1046-47 (1985). See supra note 179 and
accompanying text.
189. United States v. Young, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 1047 (1985) (quoting United States v.
Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 (1936)).
190. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
191. See cases cited at supra note 187.
192. See cases cited at supra note 187. See also United States v. Lockwood, 382 F.
Supp. 1111 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), in which Judge Weinstein cautioned that courts should not
always express their displeasure with fugitive parties by refusing to adjudicate their
claims:
Law is at its loftiest when it examines claimed injustice even at the instance of
one to whom the public is bitterly hostile ....

Our country takes pride in

requiring of its institutions the examination and correction of alleged injustice
whenever it occurs. We should not permit an affront of this sort to distract us
from the performance of our constitutional duties.
Id.at 1117 (quoting Eisler v. United States, 338 U.S. 189, 194-95 (1949) (Murphy, J.,
dissenting)). But cf United States v. Sharpe, 105 S. Ct. 1568, 1596 & n.16 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (chastizing majority for not dismissing fugitive's appeal because dismissal "would make it unnecessary for this Court to decide the constitutional question
that is presented," and courts should not decide constitutional questions unless absolutely
necessary). Justice Stevens' position in Sharpe seems a bit extreme, since his rationale
could be applied to abrogate such well established doctrines as the "plain error" rule. See
supra note 179.
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fendant's flight is the strongest justification for dismissal of a former fugitive's appeal, 9 3 courts should carefully analyze this factor to determine
whether, under the circumstances, the delay warrants dismissal. The two
primary factors courts should consider in determining whether the circumstances warrant dismissal are the length and effect of the delay.
The length of the delay is a readily quantifiable and, therefore, very
objective criterion. Nonetheless, this objective quality should not result
in an inflexible approach to lengthy delays. The courts' dismissal power
is predicated on their inherent power to manage their own affairs.194
Logically, if a delay, however lengthy, does not disrupt the courts' affairs,
dismissal is beyond the courts' inherent power. 195 Therefore, the length
of the delay is, in reality, relevant only to the extent that it produces or
exacerbates an adverse effect on the courts' affairs.
The courts' primary focus should be on the effect of the delay. As
discussed earlier, delay can justify dismissal for a variety of reasons.
First, depending on the nature of the relief sought by the appellant, delay
could prejudice the government after a successful appeal. The nature of
the relief sought is relevant because if the appellant seeks a new trial, the
government could be prejudiced in retrying a stale case; however, if the
appellant seeks a judgment of acquittal, the possibility of prejudice is
eliminated, since retrial is impossible.19 6 Second, delay could disrupt appellate review. For example, flight by a defendant in a multi-defendant
case could prevent consolidation of his appeal with his codefendants who
did not flee. Thus, by delaying his appeal, the former fugitive would
require the court to perform duplicative actions, which impedes efficient
and orderly appellate review.19 7
Courts, however, should not assume that delay necessarily disrupts appellate review. Just as the prejudice to the government depends on the
nature of the relief sought, the disruption of appellate review depends on
the circumstances. In United States v. Snow, 98 for example, the Fourth
Circuit expressly considered the effect of delay on appellate review in
finding that an inconsequential delay rendered dismissal inappropriate.
The defendant in Snow had escaped from custody within days of filing his
notice of appeal and was recaptured within thirty days. Because the defendant was recaptured so quickly, oral argument was able to proceed as
planned and, therefore, the escape and subsequent recapture did not inconvenience the court's schedule. Under these circumstances, the court
concluded that dismissal would be inequitable. 99
193. See supra notes 156-69 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 71-169 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 137-55 and accompanying text.
196. See supra notes 167-69 and accompanying text.
197. See supra notes 53, 163-66 and accompanying text.
198. 748 F.2d 928 (4th Cir. 1984).
199. See id. at 930; see also Ruetz v. Lash, 500 F.2d 1225, 1230 (7th Cir. 1974) (dismissal of appeal was without "'any rational basis" where no action had been taken on the
appeal until after defendant had been returned to the jurisdiction).
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In one respect, the Snow decision represents a keen sensitivity to the
propriety of dismissing former fugitives' appeals. In another respect,
however, it was an easy decision, since the defendant's escape had absolutely no effect on the appellate process. 2 0 For this reason, Snow should
not be limited to its facts. Rather, courts faced with an appeal by a former fugitive whose delay-causing flight had some effect on the appellate
process should carefully consider the factors outlined here-voluntary
versus involuntary return, the nature of the claim, and the effect of the
delay-and other factors peculiar to the case at hand, to determine
whether dismissal is appropriate. 20 1 By maintaining a flexible approach,
the courts will ensure that dismissal is within their inherent power to
manage their own affairs,20 2 rather than in contravention of their "virtually unflagging obligation" to exercise the appellate jurisdiction that Congress has conferred on them.20 3
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court has firmly established the power of the federal
courts to dismiss immediately and with prejudice the appeal of a defendant who flees after filing a notice of appeal. 2 1 Lower federal courts have
recently expanded this doctrine to permit dismissal of the appeals of defendants who flee before seeking appellate review and who are not fugitives at any time during the pendency of their appeal. 20 5 This expansion,
however, does not rest on any demonstrated appreciation of the underlying rationale of the decisions which authorize dismissal based on flight.
Therefore, these recent decisions raise serious questions about the approach courts should take to appeals by former fugitives.
Significantly, no decision has yet recognized that dismissal based on
flight is in derogation of the federal courts' obligation to exercise the appellate jurisdiction Congress has conferred on them. 206 This obligation
must temper any decision to dismiss a former fugitive's appeal. On the
other hand, courts have the inherent power to manage their own affairs.
200. See United States v. Snow, 748 F.2d 928, 930 (4th Cir. 1984) (Appellant's "escape
and subsequent recapture did not inconvenience the court's schedule. Oral argument was
able to proceed as planned.").
201. See, e.g., United States v. Tunnell, 650 F.2d 1124, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 1981) ("(t]he
government is justifiably concerned about [its] potential difficulty in retrying a case after
twelve years; however, such does not suffice to warrant sustaining a conviction which
might have been based on an unconstitutional presumption").
202. See supra notes 126-69.
203. See supra notes 61-70 and accompanying text.
204. See supra notes 9-32 and accompanying text.
205. See supra notes 33-58 and accompanying text. See also supra note 8.
206. Indeed, only a few decisions have even recognized that dismissal based on flight
has jurisdictional implications of any kind. See, e.g., United States v. Lockwood, 382 F.
Supp. 1111, 1117 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (finding that Molinaro does not warrant "abnegation
of this court's jurisdiction to control its calendar"); cf United States v. Macklin, 671 F.2d
60, 67 n.9 (2d Cir. 1982) (characterizing dismissal based on flight as "declin[ing] to exercise ... jurisdiction").
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In those cases in which a defendant's flight disrupts the appellate court's
affairs, therefore, the court must carefully measure the effect of the disruption to determine whether dismissal of an appeal within its congressionally conferred jurisdiction is permissible. Even if the balance tips in
favor of dismissal, however, the court should not dismiss an appeal without considering other factors-such as the appelant's surrender as opposed to recapture, or the constitutional nature of the appellant's
claims-that might weigh in favor of review. This flexible approach will
help ensure that courts act within the scope of their inherent powers in
dismissing the appeals of former fugitives.

